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Abstract
We study the collapse of international trade ￿ ows during the global ￿nancial crisis using detailed
data on monthly US imports during this period. We show that adverse credit conditions were an
important channel through which the crisis a⁄ected trade volumes. We identify the impact of credit
tightening by exploiting the variation in the cost of capital across countries and over time, as well as
the variation in ￿nancial dependence across sectors. Countries with higher interbank rates and thus
tighter credit markets exported less to the US during the peak of the crisis. These e⁄ects were especially
pronounced in sectors that require extensive external ￿nancing, have few collateralizable assets, or have
limited access to trade credit. Exports of ￿nancially dependent industries were thus more sensitive to
the cost of external capital than exports of less dependent industries, and this sensitivity rose during
the ￿nancial crisis. The quantitative implications of our estimates for trade volumes highlight the
large real e⁄ects of ￿nancial crises and the potential gains from policy intervention.
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Email: manova@stanford.edu.1 Introduction and Motivation
The global ￿nancial crisis has had far-reaching repercussions on cross-border economic activity. After a
sharp and sudden collapse in international trade in the last quarter of 2008, world trade ￿ ows declined
by about 12% in 2009 according to the WTO. This greatly exceeds the estimated loss of 5.4% of world
GDP during the same period.1 The contraction in exports was especially acute for small open economies,
several of whom saw their trade volumes in the second half of 2008 fall by up to 30% year-on-year. This
decline in cross-border trade contributed to the spread of recessionary pressures to countries which had
little direct exposure to the US subprime mortgage market where the crisis originated. For example,
the popular press has provided anecdotal accounts of how manufacturing plants around the world scaled
down production and employment in response to limited export opportunities.2
Two aspects of the global ￿nancial crisis are believed to have triggered this large decline in inter-
national trade. On the producer side, the credit crunch at the height of the crisis resulted in a severe
reduction in the availability of external ￿nance, thus curtailing ￿rms￿production and export capacities.
On the consumer side, the gloomy economic outlook in turn led to a slowdown in global demand in
general, and for imports in particular. The e⁄ects of these forces may very well have been ampli￿ed
by disruptions to global production lines, and by inventories adjustments made by importing ￿rms and
distributors. To date, however, economists have only just begun to assess the role of each of these
mechanisms. Understanding the factors that led to the collapse in trade ￿ ows can shed light on the
potential long-term consequences of this crisis, and its uneven impact across countries and sectors. It
can also facilitate the design of policy interventions to mitigate the real e⁄ects of future ￿nancial crises,
particularly on international trade.
This paper is one of the ￿rst to establish and quantify the e⁄ect that credit tightening had on
international trade during the 2008-2009 global crisis. We examine the evolution of monthly US imports
over the November 2006 to October 2009 period, and compare trade patterns before and during the crisis.3
We identify the impact of credit conditions by exploiting the variation in interbank lending rates (which we
use as a measure of the cost of external capital) across countries and over time, as well as the variation in
￿nancial vulnerability across sectors. We ￿nd that countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter
credit availability exported less to the US. These e⁄ects were exacerbated during the crisis period and
were especially pronounced in sectors that require extensive external ￿nancing, have few collateralizable
1Based on authors￿own calculations, using data on GDP in current prices from the IMF￿ s World Economic Outlook
Database for April 2010.
2See for example Schwartz (2009a,b) in The New York Times.
3Based on the developments in global ￿nancial markets described in Section 2, we date the crisis period from September
2008 (when credit conditions started unraveling in earnest) to August 2009 (one year after, when conditions had largely
calmed down). We discuss the robustness of our results to alternative ways of dating the crisis period later below.
1assets, or have limited access to buyer-supplier trade credit.4 In other words, exports of ￿nancially
dependent industries are more sensitive to the cost of external capital than exports of less dependent
industries, and this sensitivity rose during the ￿nancial crisis. These results are robust to controlling for
countries￿industrial production index, indicating that credit tightening had a disproportionately large
disruptive e⁄ect on trade ￿ ows beyond its e⁄ect on domestic output. Our ￿ndings are also not driven by
cross-country di⁄erences in initial overall development (GDP and GDP per capita) or factor endowments,
which themselves could in￿ uence trade patterns.
We also ￿nd suggestive evidence that higher pre-crisis levels of ￿nancial development mitigated the
adverse e⁄ects of the crisis. In particular, the exports of countries with stronger initial ￿nancial insti-
tutions (as measured by private credit as a share of GDP or accounting standards) were more resilient
to the crisis, especially in ￿nancially dependent sectors. This suggests that both long-term institutional
features of the ￿nancial system, as well as short-term ￿ uctuations in the cost of capital, can be important
for understanding the trade impact of a ￿nancial crisis.
Our ￿ndings imply that credit conditions played an important role in shaping the evolution of trade
￿ ows at the height of the recent global crisis. We infer how US imports would have evolved under two
alternative scenarios: (1) credit conditions remained tight, with interbank rates ￿xed at their September
2008 peak levels throughout the crisis period; and (2) credit conditions eased considerably, with interbank
rates dropping immediately after September 2008 to their low levels of August 2009. We view these
exercises as providing rough upper and lower bounds for the crisis-induced damage to trade ￿ ows mediated
through the credit channel. We conservatively conclude that the 2008-2009 crisis would have reduced
US imports by 2:5% more and 5:5% less under these respective scenarios. Estimates from less restrictive
speci￿cations that use the full cross-country variation in credit conditions indicate that these magnitudes
may be as high as a 35:2% reduction and a 30:5% improvement respectively.
Our results also signal that credit tightness contributed substantially to the cross-industry variation
in the decline in trade ￿ ows. Under the same scenarios as above, there would have been large and
systematic di⁄erences in the response of exports across sectors at di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial vulnerability.
For example, US imports in the most external ￿nance dependent sector would have dropped 13:4% more
or 8:2% less than imports in the least dependent sector, under the respective hypothetical scenarios.
These results highlight the large impact of ￿nancial market disturbances on the real economy, the cost
of crisis contagion on export performance, as well as the scope for policy intervention.
Our ￿ndings constitute new evidence on the importance of credit and external ￿nancing for export
4Throughout this paper, we use the term ￿trade credit￿to refer to transactions between a ￿rm and its buyers or suppliers
that involve the transfer of goods or services without an immediate transfer of payment funds. On the other hand, we use the
term ￿trade ￿nance￿to refer to formal borrowing by ￿rms from banks or other ￿nancial institutions to facilitate international
trade activities, such as export letters of credit or trade insurance.
2activities. Access to outside capital clearly matters for both domestic production and exporting because
￿rms often have to incur substantial upfront costs that cannot be funded out of internal cash ￿ ows or
accumulated reserves. Some of these costs are of a ￿xed nature, such as for product development and
equipment investment, while others are variable, such as intermediate input purchases, advance wage
payments, and land or equipment rental fees.
Exporting is associated with additional outlays that further increase ￿rms￿reliance on external ￿-
nance. Sunk and ￿xed costs speci￿c to international trade include costs incurred in learning about the
pro￿tability of export opportunities; in making market-speci￿c investments in capacity, product cus-
tomization, and regulatory compliance; and in setting up and maintaining foreign distribution networks.
Some variable trade costs, such as shipping and duties, may also have to be incurred before export rev-
enues are realized. Exporters￿need for working capital is further magni￿ed by the fact that cross-border
transactions on average take between 30-90 days longer to process than domestic sales.5 To overcome
these liquidity constraints, ￿rms routinely rely on bank ￿nancing or export letters of credit. The added
risk that is faced in exporting relative to domestic activities further necessitates insurance for many
international transactions.
These factors have led to a very active credit market for international trade activities: Up to 90%
of world trade reportedly depends on some form of trade ￿nance or insurance, with the total size of
this market estimated at about $10-12 trillion in 2008 (Auboin 2009). Given these considerations, ￿rms
located in countries with access to cheaper bank credit should in principle be able to produce and export
more. Our ￿nding that economies with lower interbank rates systematically export more to the US is
thus a re￿ ection of the liquidity constraints that ￿rms face when engaging in international trade.
While credit availability is generally important in all industries, our empirical strategy relies on the
observation that some sectors are more dependent on the ￿nancial system than others for technological
reasons. The growth and ￿nance literature has recently identi￿ed several measurable dimensions that
characterize a sector￿ s ￿nancial vulnerability. First, production and exporting in some industries are
associated with larger capital expenditures that cannot be serviced internally, and such industries require
more external ￿nance (Rajan and Zingales 1998).6 Second, industries which employ more tangible assets
such as plant, property and equipment enjoy easier access to outside capital because ￿rms can pledge
more collateral (Braun 2003, Claessens and Laeven 2003). Finally, in some sectors, ￿rms routinely receive
more buyer-supplier trade credit which gives them an alternative to and thus reduces their dependence
5See Djankov et al. (2010) and the Doing Business dataset. It can take up to 30 days in some countries to secure passage
of a shipment from the factory to the export dock, and a further 30 days between arrival at the import dock and delivery
at the destination warehouse. This does not include the time in shipping transit.
6Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that countries where private credit is more readily available are able to support faster
growth in industries that are more dependent on external ￿nance. In a similar spirit, Raddatz (2006) demonstrates how
deeper ￿nancial systems facilitate a dampening in sectoral volatility in sectors that have high liquidity needs.
3on bank ￿nancing (Fisman and Love 2003). This is incidentally consistent with anecdotal evidence that
most of the ￿rms reporting the biggest losses in output and employment since September 2008 have been
in computers and electronics (Sprint, Nokia, Texas Instruments, Philips, Microsoft, Sony, Ericsson),
chemical manufacturing and pharmaceuticals (P￿zer), and transportation and machinery (Caterpillar,
Harley Davidson), these being sectors with relatively high dependence on external ￿nance, low intensity
of tangible assets, and/or limited access to trade credit (see Appendix Table 2).7
We consider the central result in our paper to be the ￿nding that exports in ￿nancially vulnerable
sectors became particularly sensitive to the cost of credit during the height of the global crisis. This
result cannot simply be attributed to countries with more expensive external capital having a comparative
advantage in ￿nancially dependent industries, since this would not explain the intensi￿cation of this e⁄ect
during the crisis period. Instead, we o⁄er two potential interpretations for this key stylized fact. First,
US import demand plummeted during the crisis as American households reduced consumption spending
and American producers scaled down their purchases of intermediate inputs. Faced with reduced export
revenues, ￿rms outside the US found it more di¢ cult to raise the necessary bank credit from home
country lenders for their export transactions. A second interpretation recognizes the fact that exporting
￿rms may in practice access trade ￿nancing in their destination market, as well as in their home country.
As the crisis unfolded, the availability of bank loans and trade ￿nancing in the US sharply declined. Both
the fall in US demand and credit tightening in the US would have increased the cost of trade ￿nancing
for ￿rms exporting to the US. This in turn is likely to have posed a bigger problem in countries with a
high cost of credit, and especially so in sectors that require more external ￿nance, or that have limited
tangible assets and access to trade credit. In other words, the uneven impact of the crisis across countries
and sectors can be attributed to the multiplicative e⁄ects of tighter credit at home, tighter credit and
depressed demand in the export market, and sectors￿varying degree of ￿nancial dependence.
Although we are unable to distinguish between these two alternative mechanisms, we emphasize
that both underscore the importance of credit constraints and ￿nancial intermediation in international
trade. Looking ahead, our results also raise the open question whether credit conditions and ￿nancial
development will become quantitatively more important determinants of the patterns of specialization
and trade even beyond the aftermath of the crisis.
1.1 Related literature
Our results add to a growing literature on the role of ￿nancial frictions in international trade. A number
of theoretical and empirical papers have shown that, in the presence of credit constraints, countries with
7See articles by Healy (2009) and Rampell (2009) in The New York Times.
4more developed ￿nancial institutions have a comparative advantage in ￿nancially vulnerable sectors.8
While this literature exploits the same cross-sector variation in industry ￿nancial vulnerability as we do,
it typically relies on country-level measures of ￿nancial development (such as private credit over GDP,
accounting standards, or creditor rights protection) that exhibit very limited or no time-series variation.
By contrast, we explore the response of trade ￿ ows to short-term ￿ uctuations in the cost of capital across
countries and over time using higher frequency data. We also focus on export patterns before and during
a ￿nancial crisis, instead of on cross-country variation in steady state.
The global liquidity squeeze has renewed interest in academic and policy circles in the role played
by trade ￿nance in mitigating credit constraints at the level of the individual ￿rm. There is now a
complementary body of evidence based on ￿rm-level data showing that more credit-constrained ￿rms
indeed display a lower capacity for export activities.9 This is also what Bricongne et al. (2010) ￿nd in
the experience of French ￿rms during the recent ￿nancial crisis episode.
Our paper also falls within a broader research agenda on the impact of banking and ￿nancial crises
on economic outcomes such as sectoral growth (Kroszner et al. 2007, Dell￿ Ariccia et al. 2008).10 More
recently, Campello et al. (2010) document that the ongoing ￿nancial crisis has had a more severe impact
on planned R&D, employment, and capital spending in credit-constrained ￿rms. With regards to the
impact on international trade, Amiti and Weinstein (2009) use matched ￿rm-bank data from Japan to
show that banks transmitted ￿nancial shocks to exporters during the systemic crisis that plagued Japan
in the 1990s. In terms of empirical approach, our work is closest to Iacovone and Zavacka (2009), who
explore the e⁄ect of 23 banking crises on exports during the 1980-2006 period. They also exploit the
cross-country, cross-industry variation to show that annual export growth rates were hurt more during
a banking crisis in sectors more dependent on external ￿nance and with fewer tangible assets, but that
this e⁄ect was mitigated in countries with stronger levels of ￿nancial development.
Finally, our paper contributes to a fast-growing body of work investigating the trade e⁄ects of the
2008-2009 crisis. Freund (2009) and Levchenko et al. (2010) document that the decline in world trade
has been more pronounced relative to the decline in GDP in the most recent global economic downturns,
especially during this ongoing crisis.11 Several papers have sought to explain this large collapse in trade
relative to output. Eaton et al. (2010) evaluate the relative contributions of changes in demand versus
8See Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), Matsuyama (2005), Becker and Greenberg (2007), Do and Levchenko
(2007), Chaney (2005), Manova (2008a), and Ju and Wei (2008) for theoretical models of credit constraints in trade. See
Beck (2002, 2003), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), Hur et al. (2006), Becker and Greenberg (2007), and Manova (2008a,b) for
empirical evidence at the country level.
9See for example Greenaway et al. (2007) based on UK data, Mußls (2008) on Belgium, Manova et al. (2009) on China,
Amiti and Weinstein (2009) on Japan, and Minetti and Zhu (2009) on Italy.
10Kroszner et al. (2007) ￿nd that banking crises a⁄ect external ￿nance dependent sectors relatively more in countries that
had better initial ￿nancial development, arguing that this is because these sectors would have bene￿ted most and grown
faster from the easier access to credit in such countries. Note however that these results are obtained for a sample that is
composed heavily of less developed countries.
11See also Berman and Martin (2010) who detail the impact of the crisis on African countries￿exporting prospects.
5changes in trade frictions, using a general equilibrium model of production and trade. While they deduce
that the fall in demand was much more important, trade frictions nevertheless accounted for a signi￿cant
15% of the overall decline in the trade to GDP ratio.12 Alessandria et al. (2010) explore the role of
inventories, while Bems et al. (2010) and Levchenko et al. (2010) focus on the disruption of global
production lines and the reduction in trade in intermediate goods.13 Separately, there has also been
work examining the extent to which the decline in trade can be attributed to a rise in protectionist
policy behavior (Evenett 2009, Kee et al. 2010). We view these alternative mechanisms as potentially
magnifying the role of credit tightening during the crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the collapse in
trade ￿ ows and the rise in the cost of external ￿nance during the crisis period. Section 3 describes the data,
including the country measures of credit conditions and the sector measures of ￿nancial vulnerability.
Section 4 presents our regression results, while Section 5 interprets their economic signi￿cance via two
hypothetical scenarios. The last section concludes.
2 Preview: The Crisis-related Decline in US Imports
Our primary goal is to track how trade ￿ ows reacted to the unfolding global credit crisis. For this reason,
we examine trade data on a monthly basis for the US. We focus on these data because they are readily
available from the US Census Bureau website and because of the timely fashion with which they are
released (with a lag of about 3 months).
Figure 1 o⁄ers an overview of the main trends in US imports and exports over the 2007-2009 period.
Trade volumes were in fact recording modest trend growth until mid-2008, but this was followed by a
severe contraction, both in terms of its magnitude and speed. US trade ￿ ows witnessed a particularly
sharp month-on-month decline between October and November 2008. This coincided with the height of
the global credit crunch. While nervousness over the exposure of ￿nancial institutions to the subprime
mortgage market had been building up steadily since the end of 2007, two events in September 2008 ￿
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the government bailout of AIG ￿brought credit activity to a virtual
standstill and raised the prospect of a ￿nancial sector meltdown in the US. The Dow Jones Industrial
Average Index subsequently plunged almost 20% during a single week in mid-October 2008, dragging
down investor and consumer sentiment substantially.
12The World Bank has similarly assessed that about 10-15% of the decline in international trade has been driven by the lack
of trade ￿nancing, with the remaining decline attributable to the collapse in aggregate demand (reported in Auboin 2009),
although these ￿gures do appear to be relatively loose estimates. See also McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009) who emphasize
the much larger contraction of trade in durables relative to its production during the crisis.
13This builds on the idea in Yi (2003) that any shock to ￿nal goods demand would have a multiplier e⁄ect on the volume
of total recorded trade (which includes both intermediates and consumer goods).
6Several observations regarding the collapse in US trade ￿ ows are worth noting. First, the fall in US im-
ports was more precipitous than that in US exports. On a month-on-month basis, US imports contracted
23.1% between October and November 2008, while its exports fell 13.6%. This re￿ ects the particularly
sharp decline in consumer sentiment and import demand in the US relative to other countries.14 Second,
trade ￿ ows in the manufacturing sector (NAICS code ￿rst digit = 3) mirrored closely this aggregate
decline. US manufacturing imports were 19.3% lower in November 2008 compared with the previous
month, while the corresponding fall for manufacturing exports was 13.8%.15 Third, this contraction in
US manufactures was very broad-based (see Table 1). Focusing on the import ￿gures, no 3-digit industry
was spared, with the only di⁄erence across industries being one of severity. The worst-hit sector was by
far petroleum and coal products manufacturing (NAICS 324) where import volumes more than halved
during this month. On the other end of the spectrum, food (311) and furniture manufacturing (337) saw
the most moderate reductions, but these still registered a more than 5% fall.
How much of this trade decline was due to decreases in prices versus decreases in quantities? Trade-
related price indices are unfortunately not readily available at a monthly frequency for the US. However,
using quarterly price indices from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), Levchenko et al.
(2010) show that most of the contraction in measured trade re￿ ects decreases in quantities with one
key exception: The especially sharp drop in petroleum and coal-related products (324) was due in large
measure to the fall in commodity prices witnessed during this period as global demand slid. Nevertheless,
excluding this sector does not change the overall picture of a sharp decline in trade ￿ ows. Less petroleum
and coal-related products, the month-on-month decrease in November 2008 in US manufacturing imports
was only a slightly more moderate 17.7%, while the corresponding fall in exports was 13.6%.
This collapse in US trade ￿ ows coincided with a severe contraction in trade ￿nancing, a by-product
of the overall freeze in lending activity at the height of the crisis. While it is di¢ cult to obtain de￿nitive
￿gures, estimates of the worldwide shortfall in trade ￿nance range from $25-500 billion for the second half
of 2008 (Auboin 2009, Chau⁄our and Farole 2009). Separately, IMF reports have suggested that banks￿
trade-￿nance capacity constraints a⁄ected about 6-10 percent of developing country trade, implying a
trade ￿nance gap in the order of $100-300 billion.16
In terms of the cost of trade ￿nancing, all available accounts point to sharply rising interest rates
during the last quarter of 2008. An IMF-BAFT (Bankers￿Association for Finance and Trade) survey of
44 banks from 23 developed and emerging markets reported a broad-based increase in the price of various
14This contrast is even starker when the ￿gures are calculated in year-on-year terms for November 2008: US imports fell
17.5%, while US exports dropped a more moderate 4.9%.
15Borchert and Mattoo (2009) document that trade in services has been more resilient than trade in manufactured goods
during the global ￿nancial crisis. They attribute this to the demand for services being less cyclical, and to services production
and trade being less dependent on external ￿nance.
16See IMF-BAFT (2009).
7trade-related credit instruments between October 2008 and January 2009. While the exact magnitudes
vary across countries, there was a near doubling in the spread between banks￿cost of funds and the
rates on lines of credit or export credit insurance. A similar World Bank survey of ￿rms and banks in 14
developing countries found that the crisis led to a fall in export pre-payments, forcing ￿rms to stretch out
their cash ￿ ow cycles. While the prices of di⁄erent credit instruments apparently peaked and started to
moderate by the ￿rst quarter of 2009, these were still well above their pre-crisis levels (Malouche 2009).
These developments prompted many economists and policy-makers to press the case for a coordinated
push from country governments to shore up lines of credit (Ellingsen and Vlachos 2009), as evidenced by
the April 2009 G20 Summit commitment to raise $250 billion for trade ￿nance.
In what follows, we shall examine the role of adverse credit conditions in in￿ uencing the cross-country
and cross-industry pattern of the sudden drop in US imports during the height of the crisis.
3 Data Description
Our empirical exercise utilizes trade ￿ ow data for the US at a monthly frequency in order to track the rapid
unfolding of the crisis, especially during the second half of 2008. Since our interest is in understanding
how source-country di⁄erences in the severity of the credit crunch a⁄ected trade performance, we focus
on US import ￿ ows.17 We use monthly data for a three-year window, starting from November 2006. It is
helpful to have the data series start before 2007, as the unsustainable state of the US subprime mortgage
market was becoming ever more apparent in the second half of 2007. Our sample ends in October 2009,
amid signs of a steady recovery in trade ￿ ows (Figure 1).18
We require a measure of credit conditions across countries as our key explanatory variable. In prin-
ciple, a direct measure of the cost of trade ￿nancing, such as the rates charged on export credit lines
or insurance, would be ideal. Such data are unfortunately not readily available for a large sample of
countries. For example, the IMF and World Bank surveys cited above su⁄er from limitations in country
and time coverage, as well as (potentially) in the cross-country comparability of the credit instruments
for which rates are quoted.
In the absence of systematic information on trade ￿nancing costs, we appeal instead to a broader
measure of the cost of external ￿nance in the economy. Speci￿cally, we use the interbank lending rate
as a measure of the tightness of prevailing credit conditions in each country over time. These interbank
17We limit ourselves to the data for the US￿top 100 trading partners, as ranked by the total manufacturing imports
observed from each country in 2007. Countries ranked lower typically report more zeros in their industry trade ￿ ows. Since
our empirical work focuses more on the intensive margin of trade, it appears more appropriate to drop these smaller trading
countries. Data on credit conditions and interbank rates are also generally not available for these smaller countries.
18While the Census Bureau typically posts the trade data for each month within 3 months, it periodically updates past
data, presumably as more precise ￿gures become available. Any such revisions are, however, minor, typically not exceeding
1% of the trade value initially reported. We view this as part of the standard noise in our regression models.
8rates are the interest rates that commercial banks charge each other for short-term loans of a pre-set
duration (typically: overnight, one month, or three months), which allow banks to adjust their liquidity
positions and meet reserve requirements. More generally, the interbank rate has come to be seen as an
indicator of the overall cost of credit in the economy, especially since many other lending rates often
take their cue from it. As an example, it is not uncommon for interest rates on loans such as housing
mortgages to be pegged to the interbank rate. To the extent that the interbank rate is a noisy measure
of the actual cost of trade ￿nancing to exporting ￿rms, it would introduce measurement error and bias
our estimation results downwards.19
Credit conditions are often also measured by the interbank spread, namely the interbank rate minus
a baseline discount or treasury bill rate. Conceptually, the base rate re￿ ects the risk of systemic default
common across all borrowers in a given economy, while the spread captures the premium that is paid
to compensate lenders for the potential risk of default on interbank loans. This spread typically widens
during periods of adverse credit conditions, re￿ ecting the increased risk of bank default.
In our empirical work, we will primarily use the interbank rate rather than the spread for two reasons.
First, the interbank rate in principle better captures the total cost of capital that exporting ￿rms have
to incur.20 Second, our analysis focuses on a period of extreme ￿nancial duress, during which both the
baseline cost of borrowing and bank default risk would have risen. These two components of the interbank
rate need not move together, however. Since the baseline risk of systemic default may vary across countries
and over time, ignoring its contribution to the cost of credit would remove useful variation for identifying
the e⁄ect of credit conditions on international trade ￿ ows. For completeness, we will nevertheless report
some results based on a measure of the interbank spread.
There are some practical issues in obtaining a measure of the interbank rate. At any given time,
the actual terms quoted may di⁄er across individual interbank lending contracts, depending for example
on the perceived credit-worthiness of the borrowing institution. That said, these rates have historically
exhibited a high correlation across lending banks in a country, particularly in developed economies where
the banking industry is competitive. In some countries, banking associations and even the central bank
will quote a reference rate that re￿ ects prevailing conditions in the interbank market, which then serves
as a benchmark for the cost of borrowing in that economy. A well-known example of this is the London
Interbank O⁄er Rate (LIBOR), which is reported each business day by the British Bankers￿Association
19Survey and anecdotal evidence indicate that at the height of the crisis, credit tightening manifested itself in both higher
costs of credit and limited availability of ￿nancial capital. Both mechanisms would in principle hamper ￿rms￿ability to
export. While we cannot evaluate each mechanism directly because of the absence of systematic data on credit rationing
across countries and over time, our results for the interbank interest rate provide a lower bound for the combined e⁄ect of
both margins of credit tightening.
20It would be even more preferrable to have a measure of the cost of borrowing such as commercial paper rates that
re￿ ects the default risk of ￿rms, as opposed to that of banks. That said, there are constraints to obtaining these data similar
to those faced in procuring information on the terms of such ￿nancing, especially since commercial paper tends to be used
as a primary means of raising capital only in North America and select European markets.
9(BBA).
Re￿ ecting this reality, the Thomson Reuters Datastream database which we use can contain more
than one interbank rate series for a country, even for loans of the same duration. When more than one
series was reported in Datastream, we opted ￿rst to use series quoted by the country￿ s central bank. If this
was not available, we turned next to rates reported by banking associations or related regulatory bodies,
such as the BBA, European Banking Federation (FBE), or Financial Markets Association (ACI).21 In
the absence of such sources, we then chose ￿nally to use an interbank rate quoted by a major commercial
bank in the country.
For our baseline results, we use the one-month (or thirty-day) interbank rate, to be consistent with
the typical duration needed to complete an international trade shipment. Our results turn out to be
extremely similar using the three-month (or ninety-day) rate instead (available on request).22 We average
the interbank rate quoted across business days to obtain a monthly measure of the cost of credit in each
country. In all, Datastream provides information on interbank rates for a sample of 31 economies. While
this may not be a large sample in terms of numbers, it nevertheless covers most of the US￿key trading
partners and up to 72% of total US manufacturing imports in 2007.23 The list also re￿ ects a broad
spectrum of countries in terms of their overall level of economic and ￿nancial development, including
most of the OECD, several key emerging markets (Romania, Hungary) and some small open economies
(Singapore, Hong Kong). We do not view the lack of coverage of developing countries as a major problem,
as the interbank rate is likely a poorer indicator of the cost of credit in countries with less-developed
banking sectors, where interbank lending activity is muted.
Figure 2 and Appendix Table 1 illustrate the evolution of the one-month interbank rate over the
November 2006 to October 2009 period. Borrowing rates typically peaked in mid to late 2008 in most
major economies. This re￿ ects the rising cost of private credit as banks became extremely averse to
lending and preferred instead to shore up their capital positions. Lending rates spiked in September
2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed and AIG failed. Credit conditions only began easing in November
2008, in response to the broad range of extraordinary monetary policy moves deployed by central banks
around the world to bolster liquidity. These successfully lowered the interbank cost of borrowing from a
median in our sample of 4.66% (September 2008) to 0.44% (October 2009).
Beneath this broad trend, there are important di⁄erences in the time paths of the interbank rate
across countries, re￿ ecting di⁄erences in the severity and timing of the credit crunch and subsequent
policy interventions. This cross-country variation in the cost of credit will be crucial to our empirical
21For BBA series, we used the daily interest rate series, rather than the ￿5pm￿quotes. There are typically only minuscule
di⁄erences between the two interbank rates.
22This is because the sample correlation in the monthly averaged one-month and three-month rates is in excess of 0.99.
23The three largest US trade partners by import value that are missing from our sample are Mexico, Israel, and Korea.
10strategy for estimating the importance of credit conditions for international trade during the crisis. In
countries such as Germany and Bulgaria, the interbank rate was on a steady upward trend before an
abrupt reversal in October and November 2008. In contrast, interbank rates were declining from a
much earlier date in Canada and Singapore, where central bankers intervened earlier to cope with the
impending downturn. In China, there was a spike in the cost of credit in the latter half of 2007, well
before the height of the crisis in the US and Europe. As for Japan, although interbank rates there also
crept up during the ￿nancial crisis and fell back again as monetary easing commenced in the last quarter
of 2008, interbank rates were always very low and never climbed above the 1% level.
In addition to the variation in credit conditions across countries, our empirical strategy also exploits
di⁄erences in the sensitivity to credit availability across sectors. We follow closely the methodology in the
prior literature in constructing three such variables of industry ￿nancial vulnerability. External ￿nance
dependence (EXTFIN) is measured as the fraction of total capital expenditure not ￿nanced by internal
cash ￿ ows from operations, and re￿ ects ￿rms￿requirements for outside capital (Rajan and Zingales 1998).
Asset tangibility (TANG) is constructed as the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book-
value assets. This captures ￿rms￿ability to pledge collateral in securing credit (Braun 2003, Claessens
and Laeven 2003). Finally, access to (buyer-supplier) trade credit (TCRED) is calculated as the ratio
of the change in accounts payable over the change in total assets, and indicates how much credit ￿rms
receive in lieu of having to make upfront or spot payments (Fisman and Love 2003). In principle, the
availability of such trade credit thus provides a potential substitute to formal trade ￿nancing. Note
that while EXTFIN proxies for ￿rms￿long-term needs for external ￿nance, TCRED relates to their
short-term working capital requirements.
To construct each of these variables, we use data on all publicly-traded ￿rms in Compustat North
America. We ￿rst compute ￿nancial dependence at the ￿rm level as an average measure over the 1996-
2005 period. This pre-dates the crisis, so that its impact on ￿rm behavior does not contaminate the
measures. We then use the median value across ￿rms in each NAICS 3-digit category as the industry
measures of EXTFIN, TANG and TCRED, respectively. Appendix Table 2 lists these values and
provides some summary statistics for the 21 industries in our data.
These three variables are widely viewed as capturing technologically-determined characteristics of a
sector which are innate to the manufacturing process and exogenous from the perspective of an indi-
vidual ￿rm. This is corroborated by the relative stability of these measures over time and their much
greater variation across industries than among ￿rms within a given industry. The value of these sector
characteristics may in principle di⁄er across countries, but we measure them with a proxy based on US
data. This is motivated by three considerations. First, similar ￿rm-level data are not systematically
available for a broad range of countries. Second, the US has one of the most advanced ￿nancial systems,
11recent developments notwithstanding, and the behavior of US ￿rms thus likely re￿ ects an optimal choice
over external ￿nancing and asset structure. Finally, our empirical strategy requires only that the relative
rank ordering of the industries remain stable across countries, even if the precise magnitudes may vary.
The Data Appendix describes in detail all other control variables used in the empirical analysis.
4 Evidence: Credit Conditions and Trade Flows during the Crisis
We examine how the deterioration in credit conditions a⁄ected trade ￿ ows during the global ￿nancial
crisis in three steps. We ￿rst show that countries with higher interbank rates exported relatively less in
￿nancially dependent sectors, and that this e⁄ect intensi￿ed during the peak crisis months. Exploiting
the variation across countries and sectors in this way allows us to isolate the e⁄ect of credit tightening
from that of other confounding factors. Next, we document that at the cross-country level, a higher
interbank rate was indeed associated with lower exports to the US during the height of the crisis, but
not in the months before or after it. Together, these two steps make it possible to gauge the magnitude
of the e⁄ect of ￿nancial constraints on the level and sectoral composition of trade ￿ ows during the crisis.
Finally, we explore the extent to which strong pre-crisis ￿nancial institutions mitigated the subsequent
impact of the crisis on export activity.
4.1 E⁄ects across countries and sectors
We begin by examining the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the crisis across exporting countries with varying levels of
credit tightness and across sectors with varying levels of ￿nancial dependence. We examine three sector
characteristics that re￿ ect ￿rms￿sensitivity to the availability of bank credit and the cost of external
capital: dependence on external ￿nance (EXTFIN), endowment of tangible assets (TANG), and access
to trade credit (TCRED). Focusing on one sector measure at a time, for example EXTFIN, we estimate
the following speci￿cation:
lnYikt = ￿1IBRATEit ￿ EXTFINk + ￿2Dcrisis ￿ IBRATEit ￿ EXTFINk
+Dit + Dkt + Dik + ￿ikt (1)
where Yikt is the value of US imports from country i in sector k and IBRATEit is the interbank rate
in that exporting country during month t. We report standard errors clustered by country, to allow
for correlated idiosyncratic shocks at the exporter level. Similar results obtain under clustering at the
country-industry level instead (available on request).
We de￿ne Dcrisis as a binary variable equal to 1 from September 2008 to August 2009, which we will
refer to as the crisis period. We date the start of this crisis period to a key month (September 2008)
marked by several major ￿nancial institution failures and bailouts, including Lehman Brothers and AIG,
12that triggered a sharp escalation in the global credit crunch. On the other hand, trade ￿ ows were on
a steady recovery path by the second half of 2009, as can be seen from Figure 1. We thus designate
August 2009 as the last month for the crisis dummy, one year after the onset of the crisis. That said,
our intention is not to provide a canonical dating for the end of the crisis, since the fallout from the
global downturn is still being felt in many parts of the world. Our results are similar if we allow the crisis
dummy to stretch to the last month in our sample (October 2009).
The main variables of interest to us are the double and triple interaction terms. The coe¢ cient on
IBRATEit￿EXTFINk estimates the e⁄ect of ￿ uctuations in countries￿cost of capital over time on the
sectoral composition of their exports. We expect that countries may export relatively less in ￿nancially
dependent sectors when they experience higher interbank rates, namely ￿1 < 0. Given the ￿xed e⁄ects
included in the regression (see below), ￿1 is identi￿ed from the variation in ￿nancial dependence across
industries within a given country-month, the variation in the cost of credit across exporting countries in
a given industry-month, and the variation in the cost of credit over time within a given country-sector.
The triple interaction term (Dcrisis ￿IBRATEit ￿EXTFINk) in turn tests whether the sensitivity
of ￿nancially vulnerable sectors to the cost of capital intensi￿ed during the crisis period. Equivalently,
it shows whether the role of credit conditions in explaining industry-level trade patterns grew or waned
in importance. Yet another way to rephrase this is that ￿2 establishes whether any negative e⁄ect of the
crisis on exports was not only stronger in countries with tighter credit markets, but also concentrated on
the most ￿nancially dependent sectors in those countries. We thus anticipate that ￿2 < 0. Conceptually,
￿2 reports the di⁄erence between the crisis-driven change in exports of a country with tight credit markets
in a ￿nancially dependent sector versus a ￿nancially less dependent sector, and compares that to the
same di⁄erence for a country with lower interbank rates.
We condition on an extensive set of ￿xed e⁄ects to guard against omitted variables bias. First,
we include industry-month pair ￿xed e⁄ects, Dkt. These capture movements in sector-speci￿c import
demand in the US from month to month. They also control for the time-series variation in the availability
of trade ￿nancing in the US, as well as any monthly seasonality in the data. Importantly, these ￿xed
e⁄ects subsume the average e⁄ect of the crisis on US bilateral imports (namely, the main e⁄ect of
Dcrisis), and any di⁄erential e⁄ect that the crisis had on sectors at di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial dependence
(Dcrisis ￿ EXTFINk).
We further allow for country-month ￿xed e⁄ects, Dit. These take into account the impact of shocks
to aggregate production and credit conditions in each exporting country over time, as well as bilateral
exchange rate ￿ uctuations. They also accommodate the possibility that the ￿nancial crisis can a⁄ect
exports di⁄erentially across countries with varying degrees of credit tightness. This would have entered
as Dcrisis ￿ IBRATEit had country-month ￿xed e⁄ects been excluded.
13Finally, we incorporate country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects, Dik. These account for time-invariant sources
of comparative advantage that a⁄ect the average pattern of country exports across sectors. In particular,
they control for the comparative advantage that countries with higher interbank rates might have in
￿nancially dependent sectors on average.
It should be emphasized that this estimation approach provides a very stringent test. In particular,
the set of ￿xed e⁄ects included is exhaustive in that only explanatory variables that vary by country,
industry and month simultaneously can be estimated. This should signi￿cantly allay concerns regarding
omitted variables and alternative explanations. Consider, for instance, the possibility that the interbank
rate might capture the e⁄ect of some other unobserved country characteristic which was the actual
driving force behind the impact of the crisis on trade ￿ ows. This could rationalize why countries with
higher interbank rates may have seen their export levels decline during the crisis (an e⁄ect implicitly
controlled for with the country-month ￿xed e⁄ects). It could not, however, explain why the crisis exerted
a disproportionately large e⁄ect on ￿nancially vulnerable industries in such countries.
4.1.1 Core results
We present our results from estimating equation (1) in the top panel of Table 2, which uses the industry
measure of external ￿nance dependence (EXTFIN). As anticipated, we ￿nd that countries with higher
interbank rates tend to export relatively less in sectors with a greater requirement for external ￿nance
(￿1 < 0), although this is not precisely estimated. However, this e⁄ect intensi￿ed signi￿cantly during
the crisis period (￿2 < 0, Column 2, signi￿cant at the 10% level).
We obtain similar results in the top panel of Table 3 when we explore the variation in sectors￿
endowment of tangible assets (TANG). Since industries characterized with more hard assets can in
principle o⁄er greater collateral to secure a loan, such sectors should be less sensitive to worsening credit
conditions. We thus expect the signs of the coe¢ cients in this table to be reversed compared to the
results obtained with EXTFIN. Indeed, we ￿nd that countries with higher interbank rates posted a
better export performance in sectors intensive in tangible assets (Column 1). Moreover, this comparative
advantage was markedly stronger during the ￿nancial crisis (Column 2, ￿2 > 0, signi￿cant at the 1%
level).
Finally, in Table 4 we explore the role of access to trade credit (TCRED). On the one hand, trade
credit that is extended by upstream suppliers or downstream buyers in lieu of cash in advance or spot
payments can o⁄er ￿rms a substitute for formal bank loans. If one￿ s business partners are willing and
able to continue extending trade credit despite developments in the ￿nancial sector, this would suggest
that industries with greater routine access to trade credit would be more resilient in the face of high costs
of trade ￿nancing. On the other hand, it is possible that the willingness to extend trade credit may have
14dried up as a result of the general liquidity crunch at the height of the crisis. If so, trade credit may have
diminished during this period, with a more severe export contraction witnessed in countries with higher
interbank rates, where both formal and informal credit would presumably have been hit harder.
The results in the top panel of Table 4 point strongly to the former interpretation. Columns 1 and 2
reveal that countries with high interbank rates exported relatively more in sectors with greater access to
trade credit, and this e⁄ect became more pronounced during the crisis period (￿2 > 0, signi￿cant at the
1% level). Note that this result is not inconsistent with the anecdotal evidence of a collapse in overall
￿nancing during the crisis for two reasons. First, our measure of TCRED is based on ￿rms￿use of trade
credit in 1996-2005, before the crisis began. Second, and more importantly, our identi￿cation relies on
the technologically-determined variation in this measure across sectors. Fisman and Love (2003) have
shown that the relative ranking of sectors is similar when TCRED is computed using ￿rm-level data
from di⁄erent decades. This suggests that the ranking of sectors by TCRED would likely remain stable
when the level of total trade credit available, and presumably that available in each sector, drops.
The closely-related results in Levchenko et al. (2010) bear some careful discussion here. Levchenko
et al. (2010) ￿nd weaker evidence for the role of trade credit in explaining sector-level trade ￿ ows during
the crisis. Their analysis, however, focuses on the cross-industry variation in access to trade credit. By
contrast, we exploit both this cross-industry variation, as well as the cross-country variation in the cost
of formal bank ￿nancing to uncover the role of TCRED. In addition, while they examine the annual
change in trade between the second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, we analyze the
substantial movements in export patterns and credit conditions at the monthly frequency.
How should we interpret these results? Recall that the time path of interbank rates varies substantially
across countries, and is thus not collinear with the crisis dummy, Dcrisis (Figure 2). Our results therefore
cannot be attributed to a non-linear e⁄ect of the cost of capital on export performance. We o⁄er two
potential explanations why countries with higher interbank rates may have experienced larger falls in
their exports during the crisis, especially in ￿nancially dependent sectors.
First, the crisis period was marked by a dramatic decline in the demand for imported ￿nal goods
as households took a signi￿cant hit in their real estate and ￿nancial asset values. The prospect of job
insecurity or even unemployment also dampened consumer sentiment. Producers in turn scaled down
their output plans, prompting a reduction in the demand for imported intermediate inputs. While non-
durable goods and services may have been more resilient, demand for imported manufactures as a whole
collapsed. Note, though, that our regressions implicitly control for the sector-speci￿c decline in US
demand with the industry-month ￿xed e⁄ects.
What can explain our results, however, is that the sudden drop in US demand presented a bigger
challenge to exporters that faced tighter credit conditions. When ￿rms need external ￿nance to cover
15their ￿xed upfront costs, they require su¢ ciently large export revenues to guarantee lenders a high
enough expected return. A decline in anticipated foreign sales would thus make it more di¢ cult for
￿rms to raise trade ￿nancing. When the fall in demand and the cost of external capital are both high
enough, some ￿rms would not be able to ￿nance their exports and would withdraw from the American
market altogether. Other ￿rms might still continue exporting, but would reduce their export quantities
instead. In other words, faced with tighter credit conditions, both the number of ￿rms exporting from
each country to the US, as well as the value of each ￿rm￿ s exports would contract in response to a sharp
decline in US demand. Moreover, this contraction would be ampli￿ed in countries with high interbank
rates, and felt most acutely in ￿nancially vulnerable sectors. This logic can be formalized for example
using a model with credit constraints and ￿rm heterogeneity, as in Manova (2008a).
An alternative explanation recognizes that exporting ￿rms may access trade ￿nancing not only in
their home country, but also in their destination market. It is thus possible that US imports fell not
only because demand plunged, but also because potential exporters found it more di¢ cult to secure
￿nancing in the US, where the availability of bank loans and trade credit declined sharply during the
crisis period. Once again, these developments in the US cannot by themselves explain the di⁄erential
e⁄ect of the ￿nancial crisis across countries with varying costs of external capital, since our estimation
implicitly includes month ￿xed e⁄ects. On the other hand, if exporting ￿rms use US credit markets as
a substitute for borrowing at home, then credit tightening in the US would be particularly burdensome
on exporting ￿rms based in countries where external credit is limited, especially those ￿rms engaged
in ￿nancially dependent sectors. This interpretation raises the possibility that ￿nancial frictions in one
country can amplify the e⁄ect of credit constraints in its trade partners.24
While we do not distinguish between these two alternative explanations, we emphasize that they both
underscore the importance of credit constraints and ￿nancial intermediation in international trade. Both
interpretations support the idea that credit tightening ampli￿ed the e⁄ect of the global crisis on trade
￿ ows.
4.1.2 Sensitivity analysis
While the extensive set of ￿xed e⁄ects in Tables 2-4 go a long way towards mitigating concerns about
omitted variables, we nevertheless perform a series of additional robustness tests.
In Column 3, we control for the role of initial factor endowments in determining the pattern of ex-
port specialization. Speci￿cally, we interact countries￿initial physical and human capital per worker
(log(K=L)i and log(H=L)i) respectively with measures of industry factor intensities (log(k=l)k and
24This is consistent with the theory and evidence in Manova (2008a), Antr￿s et al. (2009) and Manova, Wei and Zhang
(2009) that foreign portfolio ￿ ows and foreign direct investment can compensate for underdeveloped domestic ￿nancial
markets.
16log(h=l)k), as well as with the crisis dummy. This is in the spirit of Romalis (2004), who ￿nds that
skill-abundant countries tend to export more in skill-intensive industries (likewise with physical capi-
tal). The only di⁄erence here is that we allow the strength of such factor-endowment motives for trade
to change during the crisis. (The double interaction terms between country endowments and industry
factor intensities are subsumed by the country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects. We therefore control only for the
triple interaction terms, Dcrisis ￿ log(K=L)i ￿ log(k=l)k and Dcrisis ￿ log(H=L)i ￿ log(h=l)k.)
Column 4 further considers the possibility that export patterns may be correlated with country size
or overall level of development, and that it is such e⁄ects which our key country variable, IBRATE, is
picking up. To address this concern, we include the triple interactions of an initial measure of country
GDP with Dcrisis and a full set of industry ￿xed e⁄ects; we also include a similar set of triple interactions
based on initial country GDP per capita. (Once again, the double interactions of initial GDP and GDP
per capita with industry ￿xed e⁄ects are subsumed by the Dik￿ s.) Even with these controls for the role
of country endowments and income, our main ￿ndings on the importance of credit conditions continue to
hold: The triple interaction coe¢ cients for EXTFIN and TCRED remain highly signi￿cant in Columns
3 and 4 of their respective tables. While that for TANG (in Table 3) is no longer statistically signi￿cant,
the point estimate retains the same sign and comparable magnitude.
In Column 5, we report results treating the Euro zone member countries as one cluster when com-
puting the robust standard errors. This helps to address the concern that interbank rates in di⁄erent
Euro zone countries track each other very closely because of the common monetary policy regime. Re-
assuringly, our results are largely una⁄ected by this standard error adjustment. Column 6 con￿rms the
stability of the estimates to removing the industry (NAICS 324; petroleum and coal products) for which
changes in prices appear to have been more important than quantity adjustments for the decline in US
imports. Likewise, our conclusions are unchanged when dropping the country with the highest interbank
rates (Turkey) in the sample (Column 7). Our ￿ndings are also robust to lagging the interbank interest
rate by one month to account for the possibility that ￿rms need to borrow in advance of the export deliv-
ery date (Column 8). The results are very similar too if we alternatively use the three-month instead of
the one-month interbank rate (available on request), given that the correlation between the two monthly
rate series is in excess of 0.99. Finally, our ￿ndings continue to hold when we date the start of the crisis
period to March 2008, the month of the Bear Stearns collapse (Column 9).
Although statistical signi￿cance varies somewhat across speci￿cations, the magnitude of the estimated
e⁄ects and their economic signi￿cance remain fairly stable. The results for TCRED are particularly
robust in both quantitative and qualitative terms. This suggests that in the very short run, at the
monthly frequency, ￿rms￿access to trade credit matters more for the sensitivity of their exports to credit
tightening relative to ￿rms￿long-term external capital requirements and their availability of collateral.
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the triple interactions with all three sector measures of ￿nancial vulnerability at the same time: The
coe¢ cient for TCRED remains statistically signi￿cant, although those for EXTFIN and TANG report
larger standard errors. The signs and magnitudes of the point estimates are, however, similar to those in
Tables 2-4. That the regressions in Table 5 are estimated with less precision presumably re￿ ects the fact
that these coe¢ cients are identi￿ed from the variation in three sector characteristics across a relatively
small number of only 21 industries.
While we are primarily interested in the total impact of the ￿nancial crisis on trade ￿ ows via the
credit conditions channel, it is important to establish whether this e⁄ect holds over and above that on
domestic output. To the extent that both domestic producers and exporters incur the same costs in
developing and manufacturing a product, they may be equally hurt by tighter credit conditions. But
exporters may be a⁄ected more because of the additional costs they bear that are speci￿c to production
for and shipping to foreign markets.
The bottom panel in each of Tables 2-4 attempts to isolate the e⁄ect of the crisis on trade ￿ ows
above and beyond that on domestic output. To do so, we would ideally like to control for each exporting
country￿ s sector-level industrial production at the monthly frequency. Such data are unfortunately not
available for a large number of countries. Instead, we control for the monthly log industrial production
index (IPI) in each exporting country interacted with a full set of industry ￿xed e⁄ects. We also include
the corresponding triple interactions with the crisis dummy. Our objective here is to account as best we
can for the overall e⁄ect of aggregate production on trade ￿ ows, while allowing the strength of this e⁄ect
to vary freely across sectors, as well as during the crisis period. Nevertheless, there are two limitations to
this estimation approach: First, output ￿ uctuations across di⁄erent industries need not be proportional
to those in aggregate production. Second, the IPI is not available for all economies in our sample of 31
countries.
Bearing in mind these caveats, the data indicate that credit tightening did have more severe reper-
cussions for international trade than for domestic output. While the point estimates for EXTFIN and
TANG in the lower panels remain largely unchanged, they are now more imprecisely estimated. The
results for TCRED, on the other hand, remain highly statistically and economically signi￿cant. In other
words, rising costs of capital had a disproportionately larger e⁄ect on the pattern of trade than on the
pattern of production. This ￿nding dovetails with the larger decline in trade ￿ ows relative to GDP
reported in Freund (2009) and Levchenko et al. (2010).
Our results so far raise the interesting question whether credit access in the exporting country matters
more for international trade than credit access in the destination country. Column 10 in Tables 2-4
provides a ￿rst pass at answering this question. As the outcome variable, we now consider US exports by
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market with sectors￿￿nancial dependence and the crisis dummy. The largely insigni￿cant e⁄ects we ￿nd
are suggestive evidence that the cost of capital at the export dock is substantially more important for
trade activity than that in the importing country.
Last but not least, in Column 11, we take a ￿rst step towards decoupling the e⁄ect of movements
in the cost of capital due to changes in the valuation of systemic risk and those due to changes in the
perceived default risk that is speci￿c to banking institutions. We re-estimate equation (1), this time using
the spread between countries￿interbank and treasury bill rates in place of our key IBRATE explanatory
variable. As three-month rates are typically quoted for treasury bills, we use the di⁄erence between the
three-month interbank and treasury bill rates to calculate this spread. (Recall that our central results
based on the interbank rate are virtually identical if we had used the three-month instead of the one-
month rate.) Once again, the availability of data on treasury rates (taken from the IMF￿ s International
Financial Statistics) unfortunately constrains our sample size. Although we typically ￿nd point estimates
of the same sign and comparable magnitudes as those with IBRATEit (except in the case of TCRED),
these are almost always imprecisely estimated. Overall, we view this as indicative that some of the trade
collapse during the crisis may have been driven by the default risk component of the total cost of credit.
To summarize, countries with higher interbank rates and hence worse credit conditions displayed a
lower volume of exports in ￿nancially dependent sectors, and this e⁄ect was more pronounced during the
recent crisis period.
4.1.3 An illustration of the short-run e⁄ects of credit conditions
We conclude the discussion of our triple interaction results with an exercise to illustrate how the impor-
tance of credit conditions for the pattern of trade evolved as the ￿nancial crisis unfolded. To this end, we
employ a more ￿ exible empirical speci￿cation that relaxes the implicit assumption in (1) of a stepwise
change in trade patterns after September 2008. Consider the following:
lnYikt =
M X
m=1
￿mDm ￿ IBRATEit ￿ EXTFINk + Dit + Dkt + Dik + ￿ikt (2)
Relative to (1), this expanded speci￿cation allows the e⁄ect of credit conditions on the composition of
exports to vary non-linearly over time: We use a full series of month dummies, Dm (equal to 1 in month
m) instead of the crisis indicator, and interact each of the Dm￿ s with the product of the interbank rate
in country i in month t and the external ￿nance dependence of industry k. The Dit, Dkt and Dik are
country-month, industry-month, and country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects as before.
We plot the evolution of the ￿m coe¢ cients from (2) in Figure 3A, to illustrate how the strength
of the credit channel of comparative advantage changed over time. Figures 3B and 3C present similar
19graphs from running (2), but using instead TANG and TCRED respectively as the industry measure
of ￿nancial vulnerability. In each ￿gure, the dotted lines indicate the 90% con￿dence intervals of each
￿m coe¢ cient. Two linear regression trend lines for the ￿m￿ s are also plotted, for the pre- and post-
September 2008 periods. (Appendix Table 3 presents in full the point estimates and standard errors for
the ￿m￿ s from these regressions.)
Two patterns stand out. First, despite some month-to-month volatility, the coe¢ cients on the inter-
actions with EXTFIN are almost always negative, while those with TANG and TCRED are almost
always positive. This reinforces our earlier conclusion that countries with higher interbank rates ex-
port systematically less in ￿nancially vulnerable sectors that require more external ￿nance, have few
collateralizable assets, or enjoy less access to trade credit.
Second, all three ￿gures clearly indicate that the importance of credit conditions for the composition
of exports increased dramatically as the crisis deepened. There is a pronounced break right around
September 2008, the month we use as the start date for Dcrisis in our earlier analysis. This is consistent
with the core results presented above from the more parsimonious speci￿cation in (1).
Figure 3 naturally raises the question whether the unusually severe and rapid crisis of 2008-2009 will
have long-lasting consequences for the pattern of countries￿exports. Put simply, will the heightened
importance of credit channels of comparative advantage persist. In other words, will the global economy
transition to a new steady state in which the availability of external ￿nance becomes a more important
determinant of trade patterns? Or will the relevance of credit conditions for trade ease o⁄ once the
2008-2009 crisis is decisively behind us? While all three graphs exhibit a clear jump in the magnitude
of ￿m in and after September 2008, they however display di⁄erent trends over time. Figure 3A suggests
that EXTFIN became progressively more important for the sectoral composition of trade as the crisis
unfolded. Figures 3B and 3C for TANG and TCRED, on the other hand, indicate that the increased
magnitude of the ￿m￿ s may be tapering o⁄. Based on this, we cannot conclusively determine whether the
crisis has indeed permanently raised the importance of credit channels of comparative advantage, and a
complete verdict will have to await the availability of more data.
4.2 Level e⁄ects of the crisis
The econometric approach above exploits the variation in ￿nancial dependence across sectors, and permits
the inclusion of a demanding set of ￿xed e⁄ects. This alleviates concerns regarding control variables and
allows us to isolate a plausibly causal e⁄ect of credit tightening on trade ￿ ows during the ￿nancial crisis.
However, it precludes an evaluation of the level e⁄ect of credit conditions on trade volumes. In this
subsection, we turn to the study of this level e⁄ect. This will later allow us to gauge the impact of credit
conditions during the crisis on overall trade volumes in Section 5.
204.2.1 Cross-country estimation
We ￿rst examine the e⁄ect of the crisis on sector-level trade ￿ ows across exporting countries with varying
levels of the cost of capital. In particular, we estimate the following:
lnYikt = ￿1IBRATEit + ￿2Dcrisis ￿ IBRATEit + Dkt + ￿ikt (3)
As before, Yikt and IBRATEit are respectively the value of US imports from country i in 3-digit NAICS
industry k and the interbank rate in that country during month t. Dcrisis is again a binary variable equal
to 1 between September 2008 and August 2009. We include industry-month ￿xed e⁄ects which subsume
the average e⁄ect of the crisis on US sectoral imports. These also control for sector-speci￿c US import
demand ￿ uctuations, as well as any monthly seasonality in the data. We report standard errors clustered
by country; results are similar when clustering by country-industry.
The coe¢ cients of interest, ￿1 and ￿2, are now identi￿ed purely from the variation in the cost of credit
across exporting countries in a given month and sector. The main e⁄ect of IBRATEit thus establishes the
extent to which countries with a lower cost of capital are able to export more to the US. The interaction
term in turn identi￿es the e⁄ect of credit tightness on trade ￿ ows at the height and immediate aftermath
of the turmoil in ￿nancial markets. (We will turn to a speci￿cation that focuses on the within-country
variation in credit conditions and trade ￿ ows later in this subsection.)
We present the results from estimating (3) in Table 6. Throughout these speci￿cations, we also
control for the log monthly-averaged nominal bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar (logEXCHit)
and its interaction with the crisis dummy (Dcrisis￿logEXCHit), given the importance that the exchange
rate potentially plays in explaining short-term ￿ uctuations in trade ￿ ows. Note that its role can now be
identi￿ed because we do not include country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects in these regressions.25
As the top panel of Table 6 shows, countries with lower interbank rates systematically exported
more to the US (Column 1). This e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level, with the point
estimate implying that a one percentage point rise in the cost of bank ￿nancing would be associated with
approximately a 16% drop in that country￿ s exports to the US market. This result is consistent with the
broader body of evidence in the prior literature demonstrating that ￿nancial frictions constrain ￿rms￿
export levels, or even prevent ￿rms from exporting altogether.
We also ￿nd that tight credit conditions became particularly damaging to a country￿ s exports during
the crisis. While the point estimate of ￿2 is negative but not signi￿cant in Column 2, this ￿nding strength-
ens considerably when we further control for cross-country di⁄erences in per worker factor endowments,
25The coe¢ cients on IBRATEit and Dcrisis ￿ IBRATEit are not particularly sensitive to controlling for the bilateral
exchange rate. This is evidently because the movements in exchange rates during this period were relatively small compared
to the observed movements in the interbank rate and trade volumes. The e⁄ect of logEXCHit itself shows up as expected,
with a stronger exporter exchange rate being associated with lower exports to the US (results available on request).
21GDP and GDP per capita, along with their respective interactions with the crisis dummy (Columns 3
and 4; ￿2 now signi￿cant at the 5% level). The results are similar when we treat Europe as one cluster
(Column 5), exclude the petroleum and coal industry (Column 6), or drop Turkey as an outlier in terms
of its interbank rate (Column 7).26 We also obtain similar results when lagging the one-month interbank
rate (Column 8), or extending the start of the crisis period to March 2008 (Column 9). Finally, we ￿nd
qualitatively similar but imprecisely estimated e⁄ects when we use the spread instead of the interbank
rate in the last column.
The bottom panel of Table 6 explores the extent to which credit tightening during the crisis was
disproportionately damaging for trade ￿ ows relative to overall production. In particular, we control for
countries￿log industrial production index, as well as its interaction with the crisis dummy. In contrast
to our earlier ￿ndings in Section 4.1, we now ￿nd weaker evidence that ￿nancial frictions restricted the
overall volume of cross-border activity over and above total output. The cross-industry composition of
countries￿exports thus appears to be important for explaining the substantially higher drop in trade
￿ ows relative to GDP during the crisis, and the role of credit tightening in this context.
The level e⁄ects we ￿nd here are consistent with the two possible interpretations we o⁄ered earlier for
the di⁄erential e⁄ect that the crisis had on cross-country, cross-sector trade ￿ ows. First, import demand
in the US plummeted at the height of the crisis, and the subsequent expectation of lower export revenues
could have magni￿ed the detrimental trade e⁄ects of tight credit in export markets. Second, the severe
liquidity crunch in the US during the crisis period crimped export activity from the rest of the world
that relies on some form of ￿nancing in the US destination market. This would have had more severe
consequences in exporting countries with high interbank rates. Overall, these ￿ndings underscore the
importance of credit conditions and ￿nancial intermediation in international trade.
4.2.2 Within-country estimation
We next explore the extent to which these level e⁄ects of the interbank rate were also manifest in
the within-country experiences. To this end, we consider a more stringent econometric speci￿cation
that includes country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects (Dik). Speci￿cally, we estimate the following fully saturated
model:
lnYikt = ￿1IBRATEit + Dkt + Dik + ￿ikt (4)
The Dik￿ s now control for time-invariant determinants of comparative advantage that a⁄ect the average
pattern of country exports across sectors, including the average e⁄ect that high interbank rates might
26Turkey stands out with its particularly high interbank rates, which is often in excess of 15 percentage points. When
we exclude it from the regression, we ￿nd coe¢ cients of the same order of magnitude, but lower statistical signi￿cance. We
ascribe this to the limited sample of countries in our data (31), and more speci￿cally to the low coverage of developing
countries where the external capital is presumably costlier.
22have on ￿nancially dependent sectors. These also control for all other country characteristics that are
relatively stable over time. The coe¢ cient of interest, ￿1, is thus identi￿ed purely from the variation in
the cost of capital within countries over time; this abstracts from the variation in the (average) interbank
rate in the cross-section of countries. In practice, we will estimate (4) for di⁄erent subperiods in our
sample, to explore whether the level e⁄ect of the interbank rate varied over time. This is similar in spirit
to (3), but slightly more ￿ exible in that we do not restrict ourselves to a stepwise change during the crisis
period in the e⁄ect of IBRATE.
We ￿rst report results for the full sample period (November 2006 to October 2009) in the top panel
of Table 7. In contrast to our ￿ndings in Table 6 which were based on the cross-country variation in
IBRATEit, we now document a positive, if weak within-country association between exporting countries￿
interbank rates and sales to the US (Column 1, signi￿cant at 5%). This within-country e⁄ect of the
interbank rate is not driven by movements in countries￿bilateral exchange rates against the US dollar
(Column 2) or outliers in IBRATEit (Column 6). However, this e⁄ect is not robust to controlling for
exporters￿industrial production index (Column 3), treating Europe as a cluster (Column 4), dropping
the petroleum and coal products industry (Column 5), lagging the interbank rate (Column 7), or using
the interbank spread instead of the interest rate (last column). We have separately also run (4) with
Dcrisis￿IBRATEit further included on the right-hand side, to facilitate a comparison to the speci￿cation
in (3). The results are similar to the top panel in Table 7, with Dcrisis ￿IBRATEit typically yielding a
positive coe¢ cient (available on request).
It turns out that uncovering the more subtle level e⁄ects of IBRATE requires that we delve further
into the data. We next break the sample into three subperiods and regress lnYikt on the exporting coun-
try￿ s IBRATEit alone, controlling for country-industry and industry-month ￿xed e⁄ects as in (4). We
designated these subperiods to correspond to the months before the crisis unfolded in earnest (November
2006 to August 2008), the most acute stage of the crisis (September 2008 to December 2008), and the
remainder of the sample period (January 2009 to October 2009). The results in the rest of Table 7 point
to a strong and very robust negative relationship between a country￿ s interbank rate and export per-
formance concentrated at the very peak of the ￿nancial crisis (September 2008 to December 2008). On
the other hand, no systematic pattern emerges for the periods before or after this peak. In unreported
regressions, we have also experimented with extending the most acute phase of the crisis (September
2008 to December 2008) to include more months, either with an earlier start or a later end month. The
relationship that we ￿nd between IBRATE and log exports tends to become successively less negative
as we expand this period, before eventually turning positive and insigni￿cant. It thus appears that Sep-
tember through December 2008 best captures the height of the crisis when increases in the cost of credit
within countries were associated with decreases in exports to the US.
23How should we interpret these results? Conceptually, the prevailing cost of credit in an economy re-
￿ ects the equilibrium between the demand for external capital and the supply of such ￿nancing. During
normal economic times or business cycle expansions, higher interbank rates likely re￿ ect ￿rms￿increased
demand for bank ￿nancing in order to service attractive investment and export opportunities. By con-
trast, during a period of unusual ￿nancial turmoil as was the case during the recent crisis, higher interbank
rates likely capture instead the limited availability of ￿nancial capital. In this context, our results suggest
that the latter e⁄ect dominated during the height of the crisis, and it is precisely during this period that
within-country rises in the cost of capital can be viewed as tightening credit conditions.27 On the other
hand, in the periods before and after the height of the crisis, within-country ￿ uctuations in the interbank
rate do not seem to have been driven by credit shortages that ultimately a⁄ected trade ￿ ows.
It is moreover important to emphasize that these ￿ndings do not contradict our earlier results in Table
6. First, in the cross-section of countries, it may still be the case that credit availability is generally higher
and export performance stronger in countries with lower average interbank rates. In particular, the sector-
month ￿xed e⁄ects in (3) control for changes in US import demand that a⁄ect all exporting countries
equally. The e⁄ects of the interbank rate are thus identi￿ed mostly from cross-country di⁄erences on
the supply side, namely credit availability. On the other hand, the country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects in (4)
ensure that the e⁄ect of the interbank rate in Table 7 is identi￿ed from time-series ￿ uctuations in both
supply and demand within each exporting country.
Second, our results in Tables 6 and 7 are consistent with our ￿ndings on the di⁄erential e⁄ect of
the crisis across sectors (Tables 2-4). Note that while movements in the interbank rate re￿ ect evolving
demand and supply conditions in the market for bank ￿nancing, di⁄erences in ￿nancial dependence across
sectors isolate speci￿cally di⁄erences in reliance on external ￿nance. This implies that even when a rise
in the interbank rate is driven by increased demand for capital due to better investment opportunities,
￿rms in ￿nancially dependent sectors will be able to expand less because of their higher sensitivity to
the cost of capital.
For completeness, we have also explored how US exports responded to the variation in interbank
rates across importing countries and over time. Column 10 in Table 6 suggests that, in the cross-section
of importing countries, US exports at the height of the crisis did in fact decline relatively more to
destinations with higher interbank rates. Column 8 in Table 7, however, suggests that this could be
driven by omitted country variables, since with the inclusion of country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects, we no
longer obtain any systematic correlation.
27This interpretation is consistent with the evidence in Campello et al. (2010) that the 2008-2009 ￿nancial crisis prevented
credit-constrained ￿rms from pursuing attractive investment projects.
244.3 Strength of ￿nancial institutions across countries
Thus far, we have focused on the interbank rate as an indicator of short-term conditions in credit
markets. The cost of lending in an economy, however, depends not only on the amount of available
external ￿nancing, but also on the underlying level of ￿nancial contractibility, namely the probability
that ￿nancial contracts will be honored and creditors repaid. The ability of ￿nancial markets to e¢ ciently
allocate resources and the degree of ￿nancial contract enforceability in turn depend on the strength of
underlying institutions. To provide further evidence on the e⁄ect of credit conditions on trade ￿ ows,
this subsection brie￿ y explores whether the export performance of countries with more advanced initial
￿nancial institutions was in fact more resilient to the global downturn.
We explore two commonly-used measures of long-term ￿nancial development. The ￿rst of these
variables is private credit (PC), the amount of credit extended by banks and other ￿nancial institutions
to the private sector as a share of GDP. We take the 1996-2005 average level of private credit over GDP
for each country from Beck et al. (2009). While this is an outcome-based measure, it has been widely
used in the ￿nance-growth and ￿nance-trade literatures as a re￿ ection of the ability of an economy to
sustain formal ￿nancial contracts. Alternatively, we also consider the quality of accounting standards in
a country (ACCT), taken from Rajan and Zingales (1998). This index re￿ ects the detail and nature of
the accounting information that companies are required to provide to authorities in a country.
To explore the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the crisis across countries at di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial develop-
ment, we estimate the following speci￿cation (using PC as an illustration):
lnYikt = ￿1Dcrisis ￿ PCi ￿ EXTFINk + Dit + Dkt + Dik + ￿ikt (5)
As before, this empirical model includes country-month, industry-month and country-industry ￿xed
e⁄ects. The triple interaction term allows us to test whether the comparative advantage of ￿nancially
developed countries in ￿nancially dependent sectors magni￿ed during the crisis (￿1). The PC and ACCT
variables do not vary over time, as these capture deep features of the ￿nancial system that re￿ ect its
initial underlying strength. We therefore do not include a PCi ￿ EXTFINk term in (5), as this is
subsumed by the country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects.
As Table 8 for private credit (PC) illustrates, the exports of ￿nancially advanced economies were
indeed relatively more resilient to the crisis in sectors characterized by high external ￿nance dependence
(Columns 1-3), few tangible assets (Columns 4-6), and limited access to trade credit (Columns 7-9). These
results are fairly robust to controlling for the potential role of factor endowments and overall income as
determinants of comparative advantage. They also obtain when we condition on the log industrial
production index by exporting country interacted with sector ￿xed e⁄ects and the crisis dummy.
The results are however weaker when we consider ACCT instead in Table 9. Countries with stronger
25accounting standards were indeed better able to sustain exports in sectors dependent on external ￿nance
and with few tangible assets, although the coe¢ cients are only signi￿cant with the former (EXTFIN).
The e⁄ect of TCRED is of the opposite sign to what theory would predict, but this is not statistically
signi￿cant. We attribute these ￿ndings to the more limited country coverage and variation in the ACCT
variable compared to PC.28
5 Interpreting the Magnitudes
Section 4 provides strong evidence that credit conditions were an important determinant of aggregate
trade ￿ ows and their sectoral composition, particularly during the height of the global ￿nancial crisis.
These results re￿ ect the importance of the cost of securing short-term ￿nancing, as proxied by the
interbank rate, on exporting activity. In this section, we perform some exercises to gauge how large a
role credit conditions played in contributing to the overall trade collapse witnessed during the ￿nancial
crisis.
To do so, we use the estimates from our empirical analysis to infer how US imports would have
evolved under two alternative scenarios. First, we evaluate the hypothetical impact of the crisis had
interbank rates remained at their peak levels of September 2008 throughout the crisis period. We view
this as providing a rough upper bound for the damage that the crisis could have in￿ icted on trade ￿ ows
speci￿cally through the credit supply channel. We then consider the opposite extreme, and assume that
interbank rates had dropped immediately after September 2008 to their low levels of August 2009. This
in principle provides a lower bound for the e⁄ects of the crisis on trade ￿ ows.
It is naturally tempting to interpret the ￿rst scenario as one in which the policy response by monetary
authorities to ease credit conditions was not particularly e⁄ective, resulting in persistently high interbank
rates. Conversely, the latter scenario might be viewed as one of exceptionally aggressive policy inter-
ventions to lower interbank rates. We would however caution that our analysis is not a precise welfare
calculation or policy evaluation. Given the reduced-form nature of our empirical approach, our point
estimates are not strictly adequate for projecting the general equilibrium e⁄ects of policy reforms. We
instead view this exercise as providing a ballpark estimate to make sense of how much credit conditions
a⁄ected international trade ￿ ows.
5.1 Case 1: persistently high cost of credit
We examine ￿rst the evolution of trade ￿ ows under the scenario of a permanently high cost of credit
throughout the crisis period. We assume in particular that the interbank rate in each country remained
28We have also run regressions with the triple interactions for all three sector characteristics jointly in Table 5 for PC
(Columns 4-6) and ACCT (Columns 7-9) respectively. The results are similar to when each sector variable is included
separately.
26￿xed at its peak September 2008 level in that country through August 2009.
To infer the additional decline in overall trade volumes that would have resulted, we consider the
estimates from equation (3). This is the regression of exports to the US by sector on the exporting
country￿ s interbank rate and its interaction with the crisis dummy, controlling for industry-month ￿xed
e⁄ects. Recall that in this speci￿cation, the level e⁄ect of credit conditions is estimated primarily from
the cross-country variation in the cost of capital.
We proceed in two steps. We ￿rst use our point estimates and the actual interbank rates to obtain
the predicted US imports from each country and sector. We then compute the predicted trade ￿ ows
under the counterfactual path of interest rates. Based on the estimates from the Column 2 speci￿cation
in the top panel of Table 6, we ￿nd that the US would have imported 35:2% less from the average country
and sector between September 2008 and August 2009, had interbank rates remained at their elevated
September 2008 levels.29
Recognizing that these ￿gures rely on a less-restrictive speci￿cation, we next provide more conservative
estimates based on equation (4). This regression controls for both industry-month and country-industry
￿xed e⁄ects, so that the coe¢ cient on interbank rates is estimated purely from the ￿ uctuation in the
cost of capital within countries over time. Based on the point estimates in Column 2 of the ￿Sep 08 to
Dec 08￿panel in Table 7, we ￿nd that the crisis would have reduced US imports by 2:5% in December
2008 had interest rates remained at their peak levels. While this impact is considerably less severe, it
is nevertheless quite sizable especially when considered against the overall 12% drop in trade ￿ ows for
the whole of 2009. As another benchmark for comparison, these magnitudes are in line with some recent
estimates on the ￿rm-level impact of the crisis: Using French micro data, Bricongne et al. (2010) ￿nd that
￿rms which had defaulted on a payment in the preceding 12 months, and hence presumably had limited
access to ￿nance during the crisis months, subsequently experienced a 2% worse export performance
relative to ￿rms that did not experience such a reported payments incident.
Our results also point to a more severe impact on trade ￿ ows in ￿nancially vulnerable sectors. To
quantify the size of these cross-sector distributional e⁄ects, we use the estimates from the triple interaction
speci￿cation (1). If all countries￿interbank rates had been kept at their September 2008 levels through
the end of August 2009, US imports would have been 13:4% lower in the most external ￿nance-dependent
sector (chemical manufacturing) relative to the least dependent sector (leather and allied manufactured
products). Similarly, trade would have been 17% weaker in the industry with the lowest share of tangible
assets (leather and allied manufacturing) relative to the industry with the hardest assets (petroleum and
coal products). Finally, countries would have exported 16:9% less on average in the sector with the least
availability of trade credit (textiles) relative to the sector with the greatest access to buyer and supplier
29Note that the predicted e⁄ects of continued credit tightness would be about twice as large if we use the results in Column
4, which controls for cross-country di⁄erences in factor endowments and overall development.
27credit (petroleum and coal product).30
These estimates provide a sense of the large impact of ￿nancial market disturbances on the real
economy. They also indirectly suggest that actual interventions were likely quite e⁄ective in averting a
substantially more severe collapse in trade ￿ ows.
5.2 Case 2: instantaneous drop in the cost of credit
We next consider the converse scenario, under which the interbank rate in each country dropped to its
low August 2009 level immediately after September 2008. To gauge how much higher trade ￿ ows would
have been, we once again use our point estimates from the respective regressions with double and triple
interactions as described in the previous subsection. This time, we compare the predicted trade ￿ ows
under the actual interbank rates to those under the assumption of permanently low interest rates after
September 2008.
We conservatively conclude that the 2008-2009 crisis would have reduced US imports by 5:5% less
under this scenario (based on the Table 7 speci￿cation). Our estimates from the less restrictive speci￿-
cation that uses the full cross-country variation in credit conditions indicate that this magnitude may be
as high as a 30:5% improvement (based on the Table 6 speci￿cation). Once again, trade ￿ ows in ￿nan-
cially vulnerable sectors would have bene￿ted disproportionately more from the increased availability of
cheap external credit. The di⁄erence in export performance between the most and least external capital-
dependent industries would have been 8:2%. The corresponding di⁄erence when considering industries￿
endowment of tangible assets or access to trade credit would have been a 9:7% gap (coincidentally equal
for both sectoral variables).
These results indicate that the impact of the ￿nancial crisis on trade ￿ ows would have been substan-
tially milder had credit conditions improved faster. The large estimated gains from lower interbank rates
also emphasize the scope for welfare-enhancing interventions, providing some vindication for the actual
policy e⁄orts to ease the extremely tight credit situation triggered by the crisis.
6 Conclusion
This paper is one of the ￿rst to establish and quantify the e⁄ect that credit tightening had on international
trade during the 2008-2009 global ￿nancial crisis. Using monthly data on US imports, we ￿nd that
countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter credit conditions exported less to the US. These
e⁄ects were exacerbated at the height of the crisis, and were especially pronounced in sectors that require
extensive external ￿nancing, have few collateralizable assets, or have limited access to buyer-supplier
trade credit. In other words, exports of ￿nancially dependent industries are more sensitive to the cost of
30These are computed based on the Column 2 speci￿cation in the top panels of Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
28external capital than exports of less dependent industries, and this sensitivity rose during the ￿nancial
crisis. Importantly, these e⁄ects of credit conditions on trade ￿ ows appear to hold, even after controlling
as best we can for domestic production. Credit conditions thus mattered for international trade over and
above their e⁄ect on output per se. Last but not least, we also present complementary evidence that
the exports of countries with stronger long-term ￿nancial development were more resilient to the crisis,
especially in ￿nancially vulnerable sectors.
Our ￿ndings imply that adverse credit conditions played an important role in the transmission of
the e⁄ects of the crisis to international trade ￿ ows. They also suggest that policy interventions that
contributed towards relaxing the high cost of credit substantially dampened the detrimental impact on
cross-border trade. For example, our most conservative estimates based solely on the within-country
variation in interbank rates indicate that US imports would have fallen by about 2.5% more had the cost
of credit persisted at its peak September 2008 levels.
In sum, our paper provides further evidence of the e⁄ect of credit conditions on trade, particularly
during a severe shock to the banking and ￿nancial sector. It highlights the potential gains from inter-
ventions targeting access to private credit, and sheds light on the role of such policies in mitigating the
uneven impact of the crisis on trade ￿ ows across countries and sectors.
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328 Data Appendix
A. Trade ￿ ows
US trade ￿ ows: From the US Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics, which reports monthly US
trade ￿ ows at the 3-digit or 6-digit NAICS level. For US imports, we use the ￿imports￿series rather than
the ￿Cimports￿series. The two series di⁄er in their treatment of imports destined for US foreign trade
zones (FTZs) or bonded warehouses. The ￿Cimports￿series records the value of these goods as they are
imported from or withdrawn from the FTZs or bonded warehouses, whereas the ￿imports￿series record
this value at their time of arrival in the FTZs or bonded warehouses (see Feenstra et al. 2002). The
correlation between the two import concepts is in any case very high: 0.9917.
B. Industry characteristics
External capital dependence (EXTFIN): Constructed following the methodology in Rajan and
Zingales (1998). Data from Compustat is used, which covers all publicly-traded ￿rms in North America.
A ￿rm￿ s dependence on external capital is the fraction of total capital expenditures over the period 1996-
2005 not ￿nanced by internal cash ￿ ow. The median value across ￿rms in each NAICS 3-digit category
is used as the industry measure of EXTFIN.
Asset tangibility (TANG): Constructed following Braun (2003), using the same Compustat data
as for EXTFIN. For each ￿rm, asset tangibility is computed as the total value of a ￿rm￿ s net plant,
property and equipment divided by the total value of its assets for the period 1996-2005. The median
value across ￿rms in each NAICS 3-digit category is used as the industry measure of TANG.
Trade credit (TCRED): Constructed following Fisman and Love (2003), using the same Compustat
data as for EXTFIN. For each ￿rm, access to trade credit in a given year is computed as the change in
accounts payable divided by the change in the ￿rm￿ s total assets. This ￿ ow measure of access to trade
credit is summed over the period 1996-2005 to get a ￿rm measure for this decade. The median value
across ￿rms in each NAICS 3-digit category is used as the industry measure of TCRED.
Factor intensities (log(k=l);log(h=l)): From the NBER-CES database. These are constructed ￿rst
for SIC 4-digit industries: (i) Physical capital intensity as the log of the ratio of real capital stock to total
employment; and (ii) Skill intensity as the log of the ratio of non-production workers to total employment.
These are calculated using 1996 data, the most recent year available in the dataset. We map SIC 4-digit
to NAICS 3-digit industries using the Feenstra et al. (2002) US import database (1989-2006). In that
database, import ￿ ows at a detailed HS-10 digit level are reported, with accompanying SIC and NAICS
industry codes, from which concordance weights were constructed. The factor intensity of each NAICS 3-
digit industry is calculated as the concordance-weighted average of the factor intensities of its constituent
SIC 4-digit industries.
C. Country variables
Interbank rates (IBRATE): See Section 3 of the paper.
Factor abundance (log(K=L);log(H=L)): Based on Caselli (2005) and the Penn World Tables,
Version 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006). Physical capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory
method, namely: Kt = It +￿Kt￿1, where It is investment and ￿ = 0:06 is the assumed depreciation rate.
The investment ￿ ow and labor force data are from the latest version of the Penn World Tables. Human
capital per worker is taken from Caselli (2005). Following Hall and Jones (1999), H=L is calculated as a
Mincerian return-weighted average years of schooling, namely H=L = exp(￿(s)), where s is the average
years of schooling in the population over 25 years of age, and ￿(￿) is a piece-wise linear function with a
slope of 0:13 for s < 4, 0:10 for 4 < s < 8, and 0:07 for s > 8. We use the average value of K=L and H=L
33over 1996-2005 as our measures of initial factor endowments.
Exchange rates: From Thomson Datastream, in units of foreign currency per US dollar. A monthly
average of daily rates is used.
Industrial Production Index: From the IMF International Financial Statistics.
Treasury Bill rate: Three-month rate. From the IMF International Financial Statistics.
Private credit: From Beck et al. (2009). Equal to the amount of credit extended by banks and
other non-bank ￿nancial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, averaged over 1996-2005.
Accounting standards: From Rajan and Zingales (1998). Index measure re￿ ecting the amount of
disclosure in annual company reports in each country.
GDP and GDP per capita: From the World Development Indicators (WDI), in PPP units.
Averaged over 1996-2005.
34Figure 1 
The Decline in US Trade Volumes during the Global Financial Crisis 
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Source: US Census Bureau. Figure 2 
Interbank Rates during the Global Financial Crisis 
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The Importance of Credit Channels of Comparative Advantage over Time 
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 C: Interbank rate X TCRED 
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Notes: Panel A plots the βm coefficients obtained from the regression: LogTradeikt = Σm  βm * Dm * Interbankit * EXTFINk + 
Dit + Dkt + Dik +εikt. Here, i, k, and t index the exporting country, industry, and month respectively, while Dit, Dkt, and Dik 
are country-month, industry-month, and country-industry fixed effects respectively. Dm is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the month in question is m. We use a full set of these dummy variables for each month in our sample, and interact each 
against the product of the one-month interbank rate in country i in month t and the external finance dependence 
characteristic of the industry k. The βm coefficients are plotted, to illustrate how the importance of the credit channel of 
comparative advantage evolves over time. Panels B and C do likewise, with EXTFIN replaced by TANG and TCRED 
respectively. In each panel, the dotted lines indicate the bounds of the 90% confidence interval of each βm coefficient. Two 
linear regression trend lines for the βm’s are plotted, one for pre-September 2008 and a second line for September 2008 and 
after. A horizontal line at 0 is included.  A: Industries (NAICS 3-digit) with sharpest declines in imports (top 5)
324: Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing -54.0%
315: Apparel  Manufacturing -33.3%
331:  Primary Metal Manufacturing -23.7%
316:  Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing -22.6%
335: Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing -22.3%
B: Industries (NAICS 3-digit) with smallest declines in imports (bottom 5)
321: Wood Product Manufacturing -12.3%
336: Transportation Equipment Manufacturing -11.8%
326:  Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing -10.1%
311: Food  Manufacturing -7.3%
337: Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing -5.5%
Notes: Calculated from US Census Bureau Data on US imports from the rest of the world.
Table 1
The Month-on-Month Fall in US Manufacturing Imports (Oct-Nov 2008)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09 EUR clus Less 324 Less TUR Lag IBrate Mar 08 US exports IBspread
IBrate X EXTFIN -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.005 0.004
[0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.008]
Crisis X IBrate X EXTFIN -0.007* -0.006 -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.014* -0.009** -0.009** -0.002 -0.014
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.010]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? No No No No No No No No No No No
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22901 22901 20208 20208 20208 19412 19461 20208 20208 20375 12793
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.978 0.966 0.965 0.965 0.967 0.967
IBrate X EXTFIN -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 0.008** 0.007
[0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007]
Crisis X IBrate X EXTFIN -0.007 -0.007* -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.020**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.008]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17695 17695 15758 15758 15758 15092 15011 15758 15758 15839 9842
R-squared 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.977 0.966 0.965 0.965 0.966 0.974
Table 2
Effects of the Crisis on Trade across Countries and Sectors: EXTFIN
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country-industry, country-month, and industry-month fixed 
effects. The Crisis variable equals 1 from Sep 08 to Aug 09, except in Column (9) where the starting month is Mar 08. Columns (3)-(11) control for Crisis X Log(K/L) X Log(k/l) and Crisis X Log(H/L) X Log(h/l). Columns (4)-
(11) control for Crisis X Log(GDP) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(GDPpc) X Industry FEs. The lower panel additionally controls for Log(Industrial Production Index) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(Industrial Production 
Index) X Industry FEs. Column (5) treats the Euro zone countries as a group when clustering the standard errors. Column (6) drops the petroleum and coal-related products sector. Column (7) drops TUR. Column (8) uses 
a one-month lag of IBrate and the Industrial Production Index. Column (10) uses US exports abroad as the dependent variable. Column (11) uses IBspread (IBrate net of local treasury bill rate) as the measure of credit 
conditions.
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry exports to the US)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09 EUR clus Less 324 Less TUR Lag IBrate Mar 08 US exports IBspread
IBrate X TANG 0.152* 0.120 0.106 0.137 0.137 0.029 0.048 0.148 0.138 -0.068* 0.078
[0.081] [0.092] [0.100] [0.109] [0.109] [0.056] [0.148] [0.104] [0.097] [0.037] [0.149]
Crisis X IBrate X TANG 0.057*** 0.065** 0.057 0.057 0.026 0.132** 0.040 0.036 -0.011 0.061
[0.017] [0.028] [0.041] [0.037] [0.028] [0.050] [0.039] [0.047] [0.035] [0.172]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? No No No No No No No No No No No
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22901 22901 20208 20208 20208 19412 19461 20208 20208 20375 12793
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.978 0.966 0.965 0.965 0.967 0.967
IBrate X TANG 0.100 0.069 0.059 0.080 0.080 0.050 -0.136 0.090 0.104 -0.066* -0.026
[0.078] [0.104] [0.119] [0.122] [0.124] [0.060] [0.172] [0.113] [0.092] [0.037] [0.051]
Crisis X IBrate X TANG 0.064** 0.063 0.059 0.059 -0.005 0.203*** 0.038 0.028 0.008 0.050
[0.029] [0.047] [0.049] [0.043] [0.038] [0.070] [0.048] [0.044] [0.045] [0.091]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17695 17695 15758 15758 15758 15092 15011 15758 15758 15839 9842
R-squared 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.977 0.966 0.965 0.965 0.966 0.974
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country-industry, country-month, and industry-month fixed 
effects. The Crisis variable equals 1 from Sep 08 to Aug 09, except in Column (9) where the starting month is Mar 08. Columns (3)-(11) control for Crisis X Log(K/L) X Log(k/l) and Crisis X Log(H/L) X Log(h/l). Columns (4)-
(11) control for Crisis X Log(GDP) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(GDPpc) X Industry FEs. The lower panel additionally controls for Log(Industrial Production Index) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(Industrial Production 
Index) X Industry FEs. Column (5) treats the Euro zone countries as a group when clustering the standard errors. Column (6) drops the petroleum and coal-related products sector. Column (7) drops TUR. Column (8) uses 
a one-month lag of IBrate and the Industrial Production Index. Column (10) uses US exports abroad as the dependent variable. Column (11) uses IBspread (IBrate net of local treasury bill rate) as the measure of credit 
conditions.
Table 3
Effects of the Crisis on Trade across Countries and Sectors: TANG
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry Exports to the US)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09 EUR clus Less 324 Less TUR Lag IBrate Mar 08 US exports IBspread
IBrate X TCRED 0.565* 0.281 0.207 0.288 0.288 -0.330 0.300 0.328 0.258 -0.133 1.732
[0.293] [0.275] [0.282] [0.311] [0.314] [0.263] [0.527] [0.331] [0.279] [0.214] [1.060]
Crisis X IBrate X TCRED 0.495*** 0.501*** 0.587*** 0.587*** 0.484*** 0.675** 0.517*** 0.471* -0.046 -0.811
[0.109] [0.114] [0.174] [0.138] [0.090] [0.260] [0.158] [0.254] [0.243] [2.147]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? No No No No No No No No No No No
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22901 22901 20208 20208 20208 19412 19461 20208 20208 20375 12793
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.978 0.966 0.965 0.965 0.967 0.967
IBrate X TCRED 0.236 -0.105 -0.162 -0.149 -0.149 -0.503** -0.846** -0.160 -0.042 -0.273 0.778*
[0.254] [0.288] [0.317] [0.286] [0.286] [0.201] [0.335] [0.288] [0.284] [0.239] [0.381]
Crisis X IBrate X TCRED 0.557*** 0.608*** 0.706** 0.706*** 0.562*** 1.323*** 0.597** 0.412 -0.139 -0.092
[0.173] [0.211] [0.288] [0.209] [0.156] [0.265] [0.274] [0.262] [0.261] [1.448]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17695 17695 15758 15758 15758 15092 15011 15758 15758 15839 9842
R-squared 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.977 0.966 0.965 0.965 0.966 0.974
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country-industry, country-month, and industry-month fixed 
effects. The Crisis variable equals 1 from Sep 08 to Aug 09, except in Column (9) where the starting month is Mar 08. Columns (3)-(11) control for Crisis X Log(K/L) X Log(k/l) and Crisis X Log(H/L) X Log(h/l). Columns (4)-
(11) control for Crisis X Log(GDP) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(GDPpc) X Industry FEs. The lower panel additionally controls for Log(Industrial Production Index) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(Industrial Production 
Index) X Industry FEs. Column (5) treats the Euro zone countries as a group when clustering the standard errors. Column (6) drops the petroleum and coal-related products sector. Column (7) drops TUR. Column (8) uses 
a one-month lag of IBrate and the Industrial Production Index. Column (10) uses US exports abroad as the dependent variable. Column (11) uses IBspread (IBrate net of local treasury bill rate) as the measure of credit 
conditions.
Table 4
Effects of the Crisis on Trade across Countries and Sectors: TCRED
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry Exports to the US)Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cty Cred Condition: IBRATE IBRATE IBRATE PC/GDP PC/GDP PC/GDP ACCT ACCT ACCT
Cty Cred X EXTFIN 0.003 0.006 -0.001
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007]
Crisis X Cty Cred X EXTFIN -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.052** -0.002 -0.030 0.002* 0.003** 0.002*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.022] [0.036] [0.057] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Cty Cred X TANG 0.122 0.146 0.083
[0.098] [0.116] [0.131]
Crisis X Cty Cred X TANG 0.035* 0.026 0.039 -0.204 -0.695** -0.372 -0.005 -0.008 0.007
[0.017] [0.046] [0.052] [0.205] [0.282] [0.317] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
Cty Cred X TCRED 0.261 0.305 -0.244
[0.346] [0.388] [0.327]
Crisis X Cty Cred X TCRED 0.394** 0.464* 0.692* -0.247 -3.533 -5.992** 0.094* 0.073 0.063
[0.180] [0.243] [0.367] [1.346] [2.327] [2.573] [0.047] [0.060] [0.127]
Factor endowments controls? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
IPI controls? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22901 20208 15758 57144 44891 20261 29489 28353 15855
R-squared 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.953 0.958 0.968 0.963 0.964 0.972
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry Exports to the US)
Effects of the Crisis on Trade across Countries and Sectors: Joint Tests
Table 5
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country-industry, country-
month, and industry-month fixed effects. The Crisis variable equals 1 from Sep 08 to Aug 09. The country variable in Columns (1)-(3) is the one-month interbank rate, that in Columns (4)-
(6) is PC/GDP, and that in Columns (7)-(9) is ACCT. For each country variable, the first column is a lean specification containing no auxillary controls; the second column controls for 
Crisis X Log(K/L) X Log(k/l) and Crisis X Log(H/L) X Log(h/l), as well as Crisis X Log(GDP) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(GDPpc) X Industry FEs; and the third column additionally 
controls for Log(Industrial Production Index) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(Industrial Production Index) X Industry FEs. Since PC/GDP and ACCT are not time-varying, we can only 
identify the triple interaction coefficients in Columns (4)-(9). (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09 EUR clus Less 324 Less TUR Lag IBrate Mar 08 US exports IBspread
IBrate -0.162* -0.143* -0.199* -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.098 -0.032 -0.021 -0.018 0.223
[0.079] [0.082] [0.101] [0.064] [0.041] [0.062] [0.092] [0.063] [0.063] [0.067] [0.260]
Crisis X IBrate  -0.036 -0.069** -0.059** -0.059** -0.066** -0.036 -0.060** -0.067* -0.126*** -0.023
[0.167] [0.030] [0.026] [0.028] [0.026] [0.042] [0.028] [0.034] [0.038] [0.068]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? No No No No No No No No No No No
Ind-Mth  fixed  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22145 22145 20208 20208 20208 19412 19461 20208 20208 20375 12793
R-squared 0.283 0.284 0.336 0.577 0.577 0.606 0.589 0.577 0.577 0.728 0.586
IBrate -0.104 -0.093 0.015 0.019 0.019 0.012 -0.021 0.025 0.038 -0.025 0.203
[0.068] [0.075] [0.110] [0.067] [0.041] [0.067] [0.120] [0.066] [0.065] [0.076] [0.306]
Crisis X IBrate  -0.031 -0.102* -0.060 -0.060 -0.065* -0.051 -0.063 -0.074 -0.083* -0.066
[0.035] [0.058] [0.037] [0.049] [0.037] [0.047] [0.040] [0.047] [0.041] [0.101]
Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPI controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Mth  fixed  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17695 17695 15758 15758 15758 15092 15011 15758 15758 15839 9842
R-squared 0.375 0.376 0.418 0.603 0.603 0.615 0.619 0.603 0.604 0.774 0.634
Table 6
Country Credit Conditions and Trade Volumes across Countries
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include industry-month fixed effects. The Crisis variable equals 
1 from Sep 08 to Aug 09, except in Column (9) where the starting month is Mar 08. All columns control for the log bilateral exchange rate (EXCH) and Crisis X Log(EXCH). Columns (3)-(11) control for Log(K/L), Crisis 
X Log(K/L), Log(H/L), and Crisis X Log(H/L). Columns (4)-(11) control for Log(GDP), Crisis X Log(GDP), Log(GDPpc), and Crisis X Log(GDPpc). The lower panel additionally controls for Log(Industrial Production 
Index) and Crisis X Log(Industrial Production Index). Column (5) treats the Euro zone countries as a group when clustering the standard errors. Column (6) drops the petroleum and coal-related products sector. 
Column (7) drops TUR. Column (8) uses a one-month lag of IBrate, the Industrial Production Index, and EXCH. Column (10) uses US exports abroad as the dependent variable. Column (11) uses IBspread (IBrate 
net of local treasury bill rate) as the measure of credit conditions.
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry exports to the US)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EUR clus Less 324 Less TUR Lag IBrate US exports IBspread
Nov 06 to Oct 09:
IBrate 0.016** 0.016* 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.015** 0.009 0.001 0.005
[0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.016] [0.008]
Observations 22901 22145 17695 17695 17005 16948 17695 17782 10612
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.960 0.960 0.971 0.961 0.960 0.959 0.971
Nov 06 to Aug 08:
IBrate 0.028* 0.023 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.009 0.008 0.030 0.001
[0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.008] [0.007] [0.015] [0.046] [0.008]
Observations 14121 13659 10937 10937 10513 10478 10937 10976 6702
R-squared 0.966 0.966 0.964 0.964 0.975 0.965 0.964 0.963 0.974
Sep 08 to Dec 08:
IBrate -0.025** -0.022** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.036*** 0.021 -0.012 -0.002
[0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.009] [0.018] [0.029] [0.053]
Observations 2566 2482 1988 1988 1908 1904 1988 2001 1144
R-squared 0.981 0.982 0.980 0.980 0.983 0.981 0.980 0.974 0.986
Jan 09 to Oct 09:
IBrate 0.016 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.040*** 0.007 0.030 0.031**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.025] [0.026] [0.023] [0.012] [0.014] [0.025] [0.012]
Observations 6214 6004 4770 4770 4584 4566 4770 4805 2766
R-squared 0.968 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.976 0.970 0.969 0.966 0.977
Log (Exchange Rate)? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log (IPI)? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cty-Ind, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 7
Country Credit Conditions and Trade Volumes: The Within-Country Experience
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry Exports to the US)
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country-industry and 
industry-month fixed effects. Regressions are performed in each panel for the months stated. Columns (2)-(9) control for Log(EXCH), while Columns (3)-(9) control for Log (Industrial 
Production Index). Column (4) treats the Euro zone countries as a group when clustering the standard errors. Column (5) drops the petroleum and coal-related products sector. 
Column (6) drops TUR. Column (7) uses a one-month lag of IBrate, the Industrial Production Index, and EXCH. Column (8) uses US exports abroad as the dependent variable. 
Column (9) uses IBspread (IBrate net of local treasury bill rate) as the measure of credit conditions. Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ind Char: EXTFIN EXTFIN EXTFIN TANG TANG TANG TCRED TCRED TCRED
Crisis X PC/GDP X Ind Char 0.059*** 0.043 0.030 -0.358* -0.831*** -0.502* -1.685 -4.185** -5.608**
[0.019] [0.028] [0.047] [0.205] [0.278] [0.283] [1.217] [1.984] [2.206]
Factor endowments controls? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
IPI controls? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57144 44891 20261 57144 44891 20261 57144 44891 20261
R-squared 0.953 0.958 0.968 0.953 0.958 0.968 0.953 0.958 0.968
Table 8
Financial Development and Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry Exports to the US)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country-industry, country-
month, and industry-month fixed effects. The Crisis variable equals 1 from Sep 08 to Aug 09. The industry variable in Columns (1)-(3) is EXTFIN, that in Columns (4)-(6) is TANG, and that 
in Columns (7)-(9) is TCRED. For each industry variable, the first column is a lean specification containing no auxillary controls; the second column controls for Crisis X Log(K/L) X Log(k/l) 
and Crisis X Log(H/L) X Log(h/l), as well as Crisis X Log(GDP) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(GDPpc) X Industry FEs; and the third column additionally controls for Log(Industrial 
Production Index) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(Industrial Production Index) X Industry FEs. Since PC/GDP is not time-varying, we can only identify the triple interaction coefficients.
PC/GDP = Private Credit / GDPCrisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ind Char: EXTFIN EXTFIN EXTFIN TANG TANG TANG TCRED TCRED TCRED
Crisis X ACCT X Ind Char 0.001 0.002* 0.002** -0.006 -0.012 0.004 0.043 0.008 0.021
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.052] [0.060] [0.106]
Factor endowments controls? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Initial income controls? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
IPI controls? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29489 28353 15855 29489 28353 15855 29489 28353 15855
R-squared 0.963 0.964 0.972 0.963 0.964 0.972 0.963 0.964 0.972
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country-industry, country-
month, and industry-month fixed effects. The Crisis variable equals 1 from Sep 08 to Aug 09. The industry variable in Columns (1)-(3) is EXTFIN, that in Columns (4)-(6) is TANG, and that 
in Columns (7)-(9) is TCRED. For each industry variable, the first column is a lean specification containing no auxillary controls; the second column controls for Crisis X Log(K/L) X Log(k/l) 
and Crisis X Log(H/L) X Log(h/l), as well as Crisis X Log(GDP) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(GDPpc) X Industry FEs; and the third column additionally controls for Log(Industrial 
Production Index) X Industry FEs and Crisis X Log(Industrial Production Index) X Industry FEs. Since ACCT is not time-varying, we can only identify the triple interaction coefficients.
Table 9
Accounting Standards and Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis
Dependent variable:   Log (Industry Exports to the US)
ACCT = Accounting StandardsAustralia (AUS); Belgium (BEL); Bulgaria (BGR); Canada (CAN); China (CHN); 
Czech Republic (CZE); Germany (DEU); Denmark (DNK); Spain (ESP); Finland (FIN); 
France (FRA); Great Britain (GBR); Greece (GRC); Hong Kong (HKG); Hungary (HUN); 
Ireland (IRL); Italy (ITA); Japan (JPN); Malaysia (MYS); Netherlands (NLD); Norway (NOR); 
New Zealand (NZL); Poland (POL); Portugal (PRT); Romania (ROM); Singapore (SGP); 
Slovakia (SVK); Sweden (SWE); Thailand (THA); Turkey (TUR); Taiwan (TWN)
1-month interbank rates
Min 5 pct Median 95th pct Max Mean Std Dev
Nov 06 0.38 1.67 3.47 8.76 19.26 4.52 3.23
Mar 08  0.85 1.22 4.31 10.27 16.35 4.97 2.92
Sep 08 0.74 1.28 4.66 12.99 18.12 5.32 3.30
Jan 09 0.25 0.50 2.16 14.59 15.14 3.52 3.61
Oct 09 0.12 0.15 0.44 7.38 10.33 1.77 2.47
Summary Statistics of Country Characteristics
Appendix Table 1A
List of Countries with Interbank Rate Data (Datastream)
Notes: Sample consists of 31 countries for which one-month interbank rate data was available from Thomson 
Datastream.
Appendix Table 1BNAICS Industry
External 
Finance Dep 
(EXTFIN)
Asset 
Tangibility 
(TANG)
Trade Credit 
(TCRED)
Phy Cap 
Intensity 
(Log(k/l))
Human Cap 
Intensity 
(Log(h/l))
311 Food Manufacturing -0.558 0.332 0.078 4.854 -1.424
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing -0.452 0.321 0.044 5.132 -0.918
313 Textile Mills -0.154 0.371 0.063 4.198 -1.893
314 Textile Product Mills -0.335 0.264 0.024 3.313 -1.671
315 Apparel Manufacturing -0.646 0.131 0.066 2.617 -1.943
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing -1.857 0.115 0.083 3.254 -1.853
321 Wood Product Manufacturing -0.372 0.428 0.037 3.816 -1.820
322 Paper Manufacturing -0.366 0.535 0.063 5.783 -1.459
323 Printing and Related Support Activities -0.487 0.296 0.084 3.587 -0.628
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing -0.175 0.551 0.123 6.857 -1.040
325 Chemical Manufacturing 5.472 0.138 0.032 5.606 -0.848
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing -0.278 0.355 0.081 4.280 -1.571
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing -0.394 0.417 0.050 4.403 -1.562
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing -0.364 0.406 0.084 5.584 -1.407
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing -0.781 0.279 0.093 4.097 -1.391
333 Machinery Manufacturing -0.237 0.182 0.070 4.380 -1.001
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0.435 0.116 0.054 4.686 -0.726
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufact -0.288 0.197 0.080 3.973 -1.297
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing -0.386 0.250 0.120 4.957 -1.643
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing -1.040 0.289 0.081 2.952 -1.387
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.549 0.135 0.042 3.597 -1.227
EXTFIN TANG TCRED Log(k/l)
TANG 0.2420**
TCRED -0.1515 -0.2312**
Log(k/l)  0.3594 0.5392** 0.2659
Log(h/l) 0.4197* -0.1292 -0.0119 0.3940*
Appendix Table 2A
Industry Characteristics: Summary Statistics
Notes: EXTFIN, TANG and TCRED are calculated based on 1996-2005 Compustat data. Log(k/l) and Log(h/l) are calculated based on 1996 NBER-CES data for US manufacturing. 
For more details, please see the Data Appendix. 
Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Appendix Table 2B
Industry Characteristics: Correlation Coefficientsmonth Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error
1 0.00338 [0.00383] 0.10263 [0.12513] 0.20688 [0.56321]
2 -0.00367 [0.00615] 0.14409* [0.07807] 0.20644 [0.27584]
3 -0.00386 [0.00554] 0.15586** [0.06499] 0.65452** [0.30333]
4 -0.00325 [0.00568] 0.06407 [0.06293] 0.05976 [0.31314]
5 -0.00479 [0.00598] 0.12507 [0.08137] 0.73768** [0.32977]
6 -0.00027 [0.00431] 0.12214 [0.08937] 0.32686 [0.37952]
7 0.00469 [0.00482] 0.03509 [0.08828] 0.29085 [0.35189]
8 -0.00506 [0.00616] 0.17052** [0.08015] 0.11309 [0.30111]
9 -0.00466 [0.00569] 0.01855 [0.08535] 0.02722 [0.24767]
10 -0.00977** [0.00468] 0.09319 [0.09404] 0.09928 [0.36896]
11 -0.00520 [0.00399] 0.14996* [0.07670] -0.22988 [0.31413]
12 -0.00353 [0.00453] 0.09455 [0.08936] 0.27730 [0.37700]
13 0.00104 [0.00567] 0.08721 [0.05216] -0.03051 [0.25969]
14 0.00452 [0.00720] 0.19761** [0.09593] 0.20071 [0.42808]
15 -0.00482 [0.00643] 0.18684** [0.08456] 0.36590 [0.27385]
16 -0.00157 [0.00490] -0.03620 [0.12810] -0.56832 [0.84002]
17 -0.00765* [0.00448] 0.15791 [0.11260] 0.90920** [0.42900]
18 -0.00506 [0.00473] 0.23613* [0.13235] 0.93986* [0.53356]
19 -0.00367 [0.00323] 0.20275 [0.14117] 0.52407 [0.60383]
20 -0.00714* [0.00377] 0.15444* [0.07774] -0.04270 [0.40620]
21 -0.00072 [0.00313] -0.08617 [0.08454] -0.72404 [0.50599]
22 -0.00060 [0.00397] 0.14719 [0.14090] 0.57939 [0.38064]
23 -0.01701 [0.01214] 0.29921*** [0.04554] 0.91069*** [0.25109]
24 -0.00050 [0.00355] 0.20981* [0.12309] 1.18691*** [0.37032]
25 -0.00148 [0.00328] 0.22344** [0.09091] 0.50832* [0.28989]
26 -0.00757 [0.00488] 0.20139* [0.10939] 1.14383* [0.61581]
27 -0.00801 [0.00724] 0.16136*** [0.04242] 0.72508** [0.30359]
28 -0.01001 [0.00824] 0.15104 [0.10445] 1.01001** [0.37692]
29 -0.01348** [0.00586] 0.16594 [0.12122] 0.56530** [0.27144]
30 -0.01858** [0.00708] -0.04240 [0.15325] -0.33645 [0.74444]
31 -0.01453 [0.01295] 0.10821 [0.12882] 0.47443* [0.26553]
32 -0.01075 [0.01228] 0.14053 [0.14127] 0.97882 [0.65845]
33 -0.01834** [0.00849] 0.13796 [0.10994] 0.65665 [0.46302]
34 -0.01643 [0.01461] -0.00417 [0.22003] -0.15455 [1.06013]
35 -0.01053 [0.00641] 0.04465 [0.17852] 0.28603 [0.45823]
36 -0.00301 [0.00531] -0.07010 [0.19918] -0.36433 [0.81224]
N 22901 22901 22901
R^2 0.96365 0.96378 0.96379
Appendix Table 3
Regression Coefficients Underpinning Figure 3
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The 
dependent variable is log monthly exports to the US as recorded by the US Census Bureau in 3-digit NAICS manufacturing industries, 
covering Nov 2006 to Oct 2009. Each specification estimates the coefficient of the interbank rate interaction with EXTFIN, TANG or 
TCRED for each month in a pooled regression setting, while controlling for industry-month, country-month, and country-industry fixed 
effects. The coefficients reported here are plotted in Figure 3.
(2) (3) (1)
Interbank X EXTFIN Interbank X TANG Interbank X TCRED